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ISSUES ADDRESSED BY AMICUS 
The issues addressed by Amicus Curiae State of Utah in this brief are: 
1. Whether ReconTrust is acting in a fiduciary capacity in Texas when it 
conducts non-judicial foreclosures in Utah. 
2. Whether Texas or Utah law governs qualifications of trust deed 
trustees conducting non-judicial real estate foreclosures in the State of Utah. 
INTRODUCTION 
INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE 
In this unlawful detainer action, Appellant Sundquist defends against an 
eviction action by the Federal National Mortgage Association ("FNMA" or 
Appellee) on the basis that the trustee of the trust deed conducting the non-judicial 
foreclosure of her home, ReconTrust, was not a qualified trustee under Utah law. 
See Utah Code § 57-1-21(3). Appellant Sundquist therefore contends that because 
the foreclosure sale of her home was not valid, FNMA is not entitled to maintain 
an eviction action. 
The State of Utah's interest in this case is limited solely to the issue of 
whether ReconTrust is a qualified trust deed trustee with a "power of sale" to 
conduct non-judicial real estate foreclosures in Utah. 
Utah's trustee qualification statute requires that a trustee with a "power of 
sale" be a member of the Utah State Bar, with a "place in the state where the 
trustor or other interested parties may meet with the trustee," or a title insurance 
State of Utah's Amicus Curiae Brief 
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company that "maintains a bona fide office in the state." Utah Code § 57-1-
21(l)(a). The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the constitutionality of the 
statute in Kleinsmith v. Shurtleff, 571 F.3d 1033 (10th Cir. 2009), saying: 
"Making it easier for Utahns to meet with trustees, who play a pivotal role in non-
judicial foreclosures, is a legitimate state interest." Id. at 1048. It is this 
"legitimate state interest" that the State seeks to protect in appearing in this case. 
Here, ReconTrust conducted the foreclosure of Appellant Sundquist's home. 
ReconTrust is neither a member of the Utah State Bar nor a title insurance 
company, and therefore is not a qualified trustee to conduct real estate foreclosures 
under Utah law. And although Appellant Sundquist raised the issue of whether 
ReconTrust was a qualified trustee at the district court, the issue was never 
analyzed or addressed. Presumably the District Court just assumed that 
ReconTrust had the legal authority to conduct the trustee sale. To the extent the 
court made that assumption, that is not a correct assumption. 
The State's interest is not limited to the Sundquist foreclosure sale alone. 
As a subsidiary of Bank of America, ReconTrust has been the single largest entity 
to conduct real estate foreclosures in the State in the last few years.1 If this Court 
*Under an agreement between Bank of America and the Utah Attorney 
General, ReconTrust ceased its foreclosure operations in Utah in August, 2011. 
State of Utah's Amicus Curiae Brief 
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recognizes ReconTrust as a valid trustee to conduct foreclosure sales, it is likely 
that ReconTrust will again enter the State to the peril of the Utah homeowners 
who are trying desperately to save their homes. But such a result would be both 
untoward and unintended, because the Legislature targeted companies like 
ReconTrust when it enacted Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-21. 
ReconTrust5s conduct is without peer. A homeowner who receives a Notice 
of Default from ReconTrust will find a telephone number listed on the Notice. But 
a call to that number is answered by a recording, not a live person. And on 
entering the number associated with the property to be foreclosed, the caller is not 
transferred to a person, but to another recording that identifies only the date of the 
foreclosure sale. It is simply not possible for a distressed homeowner facing 
foreclosure to speak with a real person when he or she contacts ReconTrust. 
ReconTrust's business practice is one of refusing to deal with distressed 
homeowners on any level. ReconTrust has insulated its system such that a trustor 
of a trust deed has no possible means of contacting ReconTrust as the substitute 
trustee. Indeed, short of driving over a thousand miles to Texas, it is simply not 
possible for a homeowner facing foreclosure in Utah to speak with anyone 
conducting the foreclosure at ReconTrust. 
State of Utah's Amicus Curiae Brief 
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The State of Utah has an abiding interest in preserving citizens in their 
homes, and in protecting the integrity of its statutes. The State wants to be able to 
enforce it's statutes against unscrupulous trustees of trust deeds who refuse to 
comply with Utah law. Putting a stop to illegal foreclosures is of paramount 
concern to the State of Utah and its Attorney General. 
BACKGROUND 
A. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE UTAH STATUTE 
The Utah Legislature amended the State trustee statute in 2001 to limit the 
"power of sale" of trustees conducting foreclosure sales in Utah to members of the 
State Bar who resided in Utah or to title insurance companies with offices in the 
State. The statute was intended to rein in the ruthlessness of "foreclosure mills" 
operating in Utah, and to provide Utah's homeowners with at least an opportunity 
to force a meeting with the trustee of their trust deed in an effort to preserve their 
homes. This statute was challenged and declared unconstitutional. See Kleinsmith 
v. Shurtleff, No. 2:01-cv-03100 TS, slip op. (D.Utah Aug. 13, 2001). The 
Legislature responded in 2002, by amending the statute again, but did not 
eliminate the residency requirement for attorney/trustees. This amendment was 
also challenged and again held unconstitutional. See Kleinsmith v. Shurtleff, 2:03-
State of Utah's Amicus Curiae Brief 
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cv-63 TC, slip op. (D.Utah July 3, 2003). Finally, following the guidelines laid 
out by the federal district court for constitutionality, the Legislature amended the 
statute a third time in 2004. This amendment was also challenged, but this time 
was held to be constitutional. Kleinsmith v. Shurtleff, 571 F.3d 1033 (10th Cir. 
2009). 
B. THE UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL'S DEALINGS WITH BANK OF 
AMERICA/RECONTRUST CO. 
Over the last few years the Utah Attorney General's Office has received 
hundreds of complaints regarding ReconTrust. In 2010 the Office began an 
investigation of ReconTrust and by April 2011, was prepared to take legal action 
against ReconTrust for conducting illegal foreclosures in the State in violation 
Utah Code §§57-1-21 and 57-1-23 as made applicable to national banks through 
the National Bank Act ("NBA"), 12 U.S.C. § 92a. 
The Attorney General soon learned - as had countless homeowners before 
him - that contacting ReconTrust is not an easy task. No public information is 
available as to their location, or names of their officers. It is not registered - and 
State of Utah's Amicus Curiae Brief 
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refuses to register - with the State's Division of Corporations.2 Unable to contact 
ReconTrust directly, the Utah Attorney General's office finally just contacted the 
office of the president of Bank of America. Bank of America informed the AG's 
office to just communicate with the office of the president of Bank of America. 
On May 19, 2011, the Attorney General sent the president of Bank of America a 
letter saying that in the opinion of the AG ReconTrust was operating in the State 
of Utah illegally, and demanded that if ReconTrust did not immediately cease 
operations, the State of Utah was prepared to take legal action. Attached hereto as 
Ex. 1. 
In June, 2011, four attorneys representing Bank of America met with the 
Utah Attorney General, his two chief deputies, and an Assistant Attorney General. 
Bank of America proposed that ReconTrust would cease its Utah operations if the 
State would not pursue legal action. After some discussion, the Utah Attorney 
General and Bank of America attorneys reached a gentleman's agreement, and 
2
 A requirement to register with the State solely for purposes of service of 
process is provided for under 12 C.F.R. §§ 7.4007(b)(2)(vi), and 7.4008(d)(2)(i). 
State of Utah's Amicus Curiae Brief 
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ReconTrust ceased its Utah operations soon thereafter.3 
In addition, in 2010, together with 48 other States and the U.S. Department 
of Justice, Utah challenged the nation's 14 largest mortgage servicers, alleging 
their many abuses, fraud, and unacceptable nationwide mortgage servicing 
practices. In February 2012, the five largest servicers - of which Bank of America 
is the largest - reached a $25 billion settlement with the States and DOJ. See 
"Utah Joins $25 Billion Mortgage Settlement Over Foreclosure Misdeeds," Utah 
AG News Release, Feb. 9, 2012. Attached hereto as Ex. 2. 
C. UTAH FEDERAL COURT RULINGS ON THIS ISSUE. 
The case law necessary to understand this issue follows a curious path. In 
Cox v. ReconTrust, N.A., 2011 WL 835893, at *6 (March 3, 2011 D. Utah), Judge 
Waddoups stated: "Under a straightforward reading of § 92a(b), this court must 
look to Utah law [as opposed to the laws of some other state] in its analysis of 
whether ReconTrust's activities in Utah exceed ReconTrust's trustee powers." In 
another case Judge Benson stated: "Defendants argue that for purposes of § 92a 
the laws of the state of Texas apply, not Utah law. The court does not agree. 
3The Utah Attorney General's office was informed that ReconTrust ceased 
operating in the State at the end of July, 2011. But recent pleadings filed by 
ReconTrust in other cases indicates it did not cease operations in the State until 
October, 2011. 
State of Utah's Amicus Curiae Brief 
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Instead, the court agrees with the reasoning applied in Cox v. ReconTrust 
Company, N.A., 2011 WL 835893 (March 3, 2011 D. Utah)." Coleman v. 
ReconTrust Co., N.A., Case No. 2:10-cv-1099, Slip Op. at 2 (Oct. 3, 2011 D. 
Utah). 
Then in December, 2011, Judge Sam changed course and ruled that Texas 
law applied to ReconTrust's qualification as a trustee of a trust deed in Utah. 
Garrett v. ReconTrust Company, N.A., case no. 2:1 l-cv-00763, slip op. at 3 (Dec. 
21, 2011 D.Utah). This was followed in February, 2012, by a decision from Judge 
Stewart that also held Texas law applies to ReconTrust's qualification as a trustee 
in Utah. Dutcher v. Matheson, et at., case no. 2:1 l-cv-666, slip op. at 9 (Feb. 8, 
2012 D.Utah). 
Then in March, 2012, Judge Jenkins issued a 29-page decision that for the 
first time reviewed the legislative history of § 92a, the Office of the Comptroller of 
the Currency's ("OCC") Interpretive Letters regarding § 92a, and applicable court 
cases. That decision is the first to thoroughly analyze the extant issue. 
Determining that Texas does not pass Utah banking laws, and Utah does not pass 
Texas banking laws, Judge Jenkins held that the "plain meaning" of § 92a of the 
National Bank Act indicates that a national bank is "located" in the State "in 
State of Utah's Amicus Curiae Brief 
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which it carries on activities as trustee." Bell v. Countrywide, N.A. d/b/a Bank of 
America Corporation, No. 2:1 l-cv-00271 BSJ, slip op., (D.Utah Mar. 15, 2012). 
Attached hereto as Ex. 3. 
ARGUMENT 
I. SECTION § 92a OF THE NATIONAL BANK ACT. 
Appellee argues in this case that ReconTrust is a national bank exercising 
fiduciary powers subject to § 92a of the National Bank Act ("NBA").4 12 U.S.C. § 
92a. This section of the NBA originated as § 1 l(k) of the Federal Reserve Act of 
1913, and was amended in 1918 by adding what is currently the last-half of 
subsection 92a(a) and the entirety of subsection 92a(b).5 In 1962 Congress 
transferred the administration of the fiduciary powers of national banks from the 
Federal Reserve Board to the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, retaining 
4
 ReconTrust has also argued that it uis an operating subsidiary of a federal 
savings association and is supervised by the Office of Thrift Supervision. C.F.R. § 
550.70. A federal savings association's authority to exercise fiduciary powers, 
including the authority to act as a trustee in foreclosure sales, derives from the 
Home Owner's Loan Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1464(n)." See Lawrence v. ReconTrust, 
case no. 1:08-cv-66 DB (D.Utah), Notice of Removal, T{ 4 (Doc. 2), and Eighth 
Affirmative Defense in Defendants' Answer to Plaintiffs Complaint, (Doc. 6). 
5Pub. L. No. 63-43, ll(k), 38 Stat. 251, 262 (1913); Pub. L. No. 65-218, 2, 
40 Stat. 967, 968-69 (1918). 
State of Utah's Amicus Curiae Brief 
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the then existing language of § 1 l(k) as § 92a of the National Bank Act.6 
Section § 92a(a)-(b) of the National Bank Act provides: 
(a) The Comptroller of the Currency shall be authorized 
and empowered to grant by special permit to national 
banks applying therefore, when not in contravention of 
State or local law, the right to act as trustee, executor, 
administrator, registrar of stocks and bonds, guardian of 
estates, assignee, receiver, committee of estates of 
lunatics, or in any other fiduciary capacity in which State 
banks, trust companies, or other corporations which 
come into competition with national banks are permitted 
to act under the laws of the State in which the national 
bank is located. 
(b) Whenever the laws of such State authorize or permit 
the exercise of any or all of the foregoing powers by 
State banks, trust companies, or other corporations which 
compete with national banks, the granting to and the 
exercise of such powers by national banks shall not be 
deemed to be in contravention of State or local law 
within the meaning of this section. 
12 U.S.C. § 92a(a)-(b) (emphasis added). The italicized language above is 
commonly referred to by the OCC as the "State law condition" or "contravention 
clause." It is an example of Congress granting a national bank an "explicit power 
with an explicit statement that the exercise of that power is subject to State law." 
Barnett v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 34 (1996). Thus, even though the NBA preempts 
6
 Pub. L. No. 87-722, 76 Stat. 668 (1962). 
State of Utah's Amicus Curiae Brief 
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State law, § 92a of the NBA provides that national banks exercising fiduciary 
powers are subject to the law of the State in which they act. 
In short, the principle of subsection (a) is that a national bank having 
fiduciary powers may exercise those powers in a State to the same extent that State 
allows its State-chartered banks to exercise fiduciary powers. Subsection (b) is 
somewhat the flip side of subsection (a) in that it provides that a national bank 
having fiduciary powers may exercise those powers in a State to the same degree a 
State bank is authorized to exercise those powers - even if that State's laws 
specifically prohibits national banks from exercising those fiduciary powers. In 
essence, both subsections stand for the principle that regardless of what a State 
statute may say relative to a national banks' exercise of fiduciary powers, a 
national bank may exercise fiduciary powers in a State to the exact same extent 
that State law permits its State-chartered banks to exercise fiduciary powers. 
Tying national banks to the law of the State in which they operate has been 
known variously in banking law as "parity," "equalization," or "competitive 
equality." 
Appellee and ReconTrust do not deny the existence of the "State law 
condition," but deny the application of "competitive equality" to § 92a. They 
claim that the State law ReconTrust is subject to is the law of Texas because that is 
State of Utah's Amicus Curiae Brief 
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where ReconTrust is "located/' and hence that is where it conducts its fiduciary 
business.7 In this, they are sadly mistaken. 
A. UNDERSTANDING THE "STATE LAW CONDITION" IN ITS LEGAL AND 
HISTORICAL CONTEXT. 
We begin with first principles. The National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 21 et 
seq., first enacted in 1863 and reenacted in 1864, provides for the formation and 
regulation of national banks. See U.S. Nat'I Bank of Or. v. Indep. Ins. Agents of 
Am., Inc., 508 U.S. 439, 449 (1993). National banks are federal instrumentalities, 
in that they are organized and exist under the laws of the United States - but they 
are also privately owned businesses headquartered in a particular State and, in 
general, subject to the laws of that State. See Natl Bank v. Commonwealth, 76 
U.S. (9 Wall.) 353, 361-62 (1869), Guthrie v. Harkness, 199 U.S. 148, 157 (1905). 
Rather than displace State banking systems, the National Bank Act established 
what has come to be known as the "dual banking system," in which federal and 
State chartered banks coexist in relative "competitive equality." See First Natl 
Bank in Plant City v. Dickinson, 396 U.S. 122, 131-33 (1969), First Natl Bank of 
7In some cases, however, ReconTrust has claimed that its fiduciary activities 
are conducted in California when conducting foreclosures in Utah. See Lawrence 
v. ReconTrust, case no. l:08-cv-66 DB (D. Utah), Mem. in Support of Cross-
Motion for Sum. J., p. 15. (Doc. 45.) 
State of Utah's Amicus Curiae Brief 
Supreme Court Case No. 20110575 
Paf fP 1? 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Logan, Utah v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 385 U.S. 252, 261-63 (1967). 
"There can be little question... that at the time the 1864 Act was passed, the 
activities of a national bank were restricted to one particular location." Citizens 
and Southern Nat'l Bankv. Bougas, 434 U.S. 35, 42-43 (1977). That is, a national 
bank had one bank location and was limited to doing business only at that 
location. That condition existed for national banks until 1927, when Congress 
passed the McFadden Act allowing national banks to establish branches to the 
extent permitted by State law. 44 Stat. 1228. 
Thus, when Congress originally passed § 92a(a)'s "State law condition" in 
1913 it was dealing with a legal and fact situation in which a national bank was 
limited by its charter to operating at only one location. That was also the case 
when subsection (b)'s State law condition was drafted in 1918. So, the language 
of § 92a(a) and (b) - which has never been amended - never contemplated today's 
national banking system of national banks operating in multiple States. As a 
result, the language of the statute may not be as crystal clear in applying the 
concept of the "State law condition" today as when it was drafted. But the concept 
of the "State law condition" is very much a part of the statute and its meaning is 
central to this case. 
B. "COMPETITIVE EQUALITY" IS THE KEY TO UNDERSTANDING 
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WHICH STATE LAW APPLIES UNDER THE "STATE LAW 
CONDITION" 
When Congress passed what is now § 92a in 1913, it was not concerned 
with dissecting where a bank was located versus where it conducted its fiduciary 
activities - those were synonymous at the time. And Congress certainly did not 
write the language of § 92a in 1913-18 contemplating today's multi-state banking 
system. Rather, Congress was concerned with providing a level playing field - or 
"competitive equality" - between national and State banks conducting business in 
the same State. Making national banks subject to State law put national banks on 
the same footing as State banks. That is what is meant by the terms "parity," 
"equalization," and/or "competitive equality." 
"The policy of competitive equality is ... firmly embedded in the statutes 
governing the national banking system," wrote Chief Justice Warren Burger. "The 
mechanism of referring to state law is simply one designed to implement that 
congressional intent and build into the federal statute a self-executing provision to 
accommodate to changes in state regulation." First Nat'I Bank v. Dickinson, 396 
U.S. 122, 133 (1969). 
Every federal court to have had occasion to opine on the subject of applying 
competitive equality to § 92a has held that it applies. In 1976, the Eight Circuit 
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Court of Appeals stated, "[t]he policy of competitive equality was incorporated 
into section 92a." St. Louis County National Bank v. Mercantile Trust Co., N. A., 
548 F.2d 716, 720 (1976). Ten years earlier, the Fifth Circuit determined it "is 
obvious from the most cursory reading of... 12 U.S.C. § 92a" that it places 
"national banks on an equal competitive basis with state banks and trust 
companies in the state where the national bank is situated." Blaney v. Florida 
National Bank at Orlando, 357 F.2d 27, 30 (1966). 
So too in American Trust Co. v. South Carolina State Board of Bank 
Control, 381 F.Supp. 313, 323 (D.S.C. 1974), in which a federal district court 
said: 
[When Congress] authorized national banks to operate 
branches to the same extent that a state bank located in 
the same state could operate them, it intended to create 
'competitive equality' between state and national banks 
located in the same state. It is apparent that in enacting § 
92a, Congress intended to create the same kind of 
'competitive equality' with regard to trust services. 
(internal citations omitted.) In New Hampshire Bankers Assoc, v. Nelson, 336 
F.Supp. 1330, 1334 (1972), the court held: "The New Hampshire statute does not 
put the national banks at any competitive disadvantage with state banks. Both are 
treated equally. 12 U.S.C. § 92a allows national banks to offer the equivalent 
fiduciary services to their customers as do state banks." Aff d, 460 F.2d 307 (1st 
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Cir.), cert, denied, 409 U.S. 1001, 93 S.Ct. 320, 34 LJEd.2d 262 (1972). And in 
Investment Company Institute v. Camp, 274 F.Supp. 624 (1967), the D.C. District 
Court stated that "Section 12 U.S.C. 92a(a), however, permits a national bank to 
act 'in any other fiduciary capacity in which State banks, trust companies, or other 
corporations which come into competition with national banks are permitted to act 
under the laws of the State in which the national bank is located.'" Id. at 640. 
1. WHILE "COMPETITIVE EQUALITY" IS MOST COMMONLY 
ASSOCIATED WITH BRANCH BANKING, IT IS CERTAINLY NOT 
LIMITED TO THAT, 
The concept of competitive equality has historically received the greatest 
attention in the area of branch banking, but it is not limited only to that area of 
' banking law. As is stated in the most oft-cited case on the subject, involving two 
national banks that were attempting to establish branch banks in the State of Utah, 
the U.S. Supreme Court declared that the Comptroller of the Currency could not 
trump Utah law: 
... Congress intended to place national and state banks on 
a basis of 'competitive equality' insofar as branch 
banking was concerned. 
* * * To us it appears beyond question that the 
Congress was continuing its policy of equalization first 
adopted in the National Bank Act of1864. 
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First Natl Bank of Logan, Utahv. Walker Bank andTrust Co., 385 U.S. 252,261 
(1966) (emphasis added). 
In addition to fiduciary activities and branch banking, Congress has 
expressly incorporated State law as the governing standard for national banks in 
such banking areas as conversions of state banks into national banks, see 12 
U.S.C. § 35; interstate de novo branch banks, see 12 U.S.C. § 36(g); accepting 
deposits from state and local governments, see 12 U.S.C. § 90; mergers or 
consolidation of national banks with state banks, see 12 U.S.C. § 214c; 
acquisitions of state banks by consolidation, see 12 U.S.C. § 215(d); and 
acquisitions of state banks by merger, see 12 U.S.C. § 215a(d). 
2. APPLYING "COMPETITIVE EQUALITY" TO THIS CASE. 
It is hardly a matter of "competitive equality" to require a national bank 
located in Texas, but conducting business in Utah, to follow one set of rules, and 
require another national bank, which is both located and conducting business in 
Utah, to follow another set of rules. That scenario flies in the face of a "level 
playing field." But that is Appellee's argument: a national bank located in Texas 
plays by Texas rules when conducting business in Utah, while national banks 
located in the State has to play by Utah's rules. That makes no sense. 
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II. RECONTRUST' S CLAIM FOR EXEMPTION FROM UTAH LAW. 
A. WHERE DOES A SUBSTITUTE TRUSTEE OF A TRUST DEED ACCEPT 
ITS APPOINTMENT? 
ReconTrust relies on one sentence in Rule 9.7(d) to support its claim that 
ReconTrust acts in Texas when it conducts foreclosures in Utah. 12 C.F.R. § 
9.7(d). Aplee. Br., p. 24-25. That sentence reads: "A national bank acts in a 
fiduciary capacity in the state in which it accepts the fiduciary appointment, 
executes the documents that create the fiduciary relationship, and makes 
discretionary decisions regarding the investment or distribution of fiduciary 
assets." Rule 9.7 is attached hereto as Exhibit 4. 
Appellee claims that Texas is where ReconTrust accepts its fiduciary 
appointment to act as a substitute trustee of a trust deed, but there is no formal 
appointment procedure in Texas for appointing a substitute trustee of a trust deed 
in Utah.8 Rather, the appointment of a trustee of a trust deed originates with the 
trust deed itself. Without the trust deed there is no trustee. In the case of a Utah 
trust deed, the document evidencing the appointment of a substitute trustee is the 
Notice of Substitution of Trustee. Utah Code § 57-l-22(l)(a) states: 
8In all the cases challenging ReconTrust as qualified trustee in Utah, 
ReconTrust has never once supplied the court with a document evidencing an 
appointment as substitute trustee - other than the notice of substitution of trustee. 
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The beneficiary may appoint a successor trustee at any 
time by filing for record in the office of the county 
recorder of each county in which the trust property or 
some part of the trust property is situated, a substitution 
of trustee. (Emphasis added.) 
Thus, there is no appointment of a substitute trustee for a trust deed recorded in 
Utah until the Notice of Substitution of Trustee is recorded in the county 
recorder's office in which the property is situated. 
For a foreclosure in Utah, there is no such thing as a formal appointment of 
a substitute trustee other than the recording of the Notice of Substitution of 
Trustee. Executing the substitution of trustee - without recording it - has no legal 
significance. The appointment, as stated in Utah Code § 57-l-22(l)(a), occurs 
when the Notice of Substitution of Trustee is recorded in the county in with the 
property is situated. That constitutes the appointment. There is no statutory 
criteria for what constitutes the appointment in federal law or regulation. Rather, 
the only legal criteria for the appointment of a trustee of a Utah trust deed is Utah 
law. 
The same applies to other documents ReconTrust executes to conduct a 
foreclosure, i.e. Notice of Default and Notice of Trustee's Sale. Where the 
document is executed has absolutely no legal effect. Where they are recorded 
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does. See Utah Code §§ 57-1-24 and 25. And for a Notice of Default and Notice 
of Trustee's Sale to have legal effect for purposes of foreclosing a trust deed in 
Utah, those notices must be recorded in the county in which the property is 
situated. Recording is what gives those documents legal effect - not where they 
are executed. 
But Appellee persists by saying: 
Indeed, nothing in the record or in Sundquisfs brief 
indicates that Utah is where ReconTrust accepts its 
fiduciary appointment, executes documents creating the 
fiduciary relationship, or makes discretionary decisions. 
Accordingly, pursuant to 12 C.F.R. § 9.7(e)(1) 4[t]he 
state laws that apply to [ReconTrust' s] fiduciary activites 
by virtue of 12 U.S.C. § 92a are the laws of Texas, not 
Utah. 
Aplee. Br., p. 26. The irony with this statement is that neither is there anything in 
the record that indicates that Texas is where ReconTrust accepts its fiduciary 
appointment, executes documents creating the fiduciary relationship, or makes its 
discretionary decisions. The record is just absent any of that evidence. But Utah 
law makes perfectly clear what constitutes an appointment of a substitute trustee. 
It also makes clear that the other documents necessary to process a non-judicial 
foreclosure only have legal significance when they are recorded. 
State of Utah's Amicus Curiae Brief 
Supreme Court Case No. 20110575 
Pase 20 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
B. WHERE IS A BANK "LOCATED"? 
In arguing that ReconTrust is a valid trustee to conduct foreclosures in 
Utah, Appellee states: 
ReconTrust is a national banking association operating 
under the NBA, which specifies that the state law 
applicable to ReconTrust's authority to act as trustee is 
the State law where the bank is "located" (12 U.S.C. § 
92a(a)). ReconTrust is "located" in Texas and, under the 
NBA and implementing regulations, it must conform its 
activities to Texas law. To the extent that Utah law 
imposes additional requirements on ReconTrust, it is 
preempted by the NBA and the OCC's regulations 
implementing the statute, 12 C.F.R. § 9.7. 
Aplee. Br., p. 23. 
1. The OCC's Statement of Basis and Purpose for Rule 9.7 
States that "Location" is not Determined by the Presence 
of a Main Office or Branch. 
In the basis and purpose statement accompanying the promulgation of Rule 
9.7, set out in the Federal Register in 2001, the OCC declares, "we disagree that 
'location' for purposes of section 92a is appropriately determined by the presence 
of a main office or bank branch." 66 FR 34792-01, at *34794, 2001 WL 731641. 
The OCC Statement of Basis and Purpose for Rule 9.7 is attached hereto as 
Exhibit 5. 
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The OCC's analysis of Rule 9.7 completely undoes Appellee's and 
ReconTrusfs argument as to the one sentence they persist in quoting from Rule 
9.7(d). The OCC makes clear that where a bank is headquartered, or has a branch 
bank, does not determine where it is located for purposes of the "State law 
condition." Rather, where the bank acts is the determining factor. Referring to § 
92a's "contravention clause," the OCC states: 
[S]ection 92a(a) requires that a national bank look to the 
laws of the state in which it acts, or proposes to act, in a 
fiduciary capacity to determine what fiduciary capacities are 
permissible. 
66 FR 34792-01, at *34794. 
The OCC's analysis makes no mention of a bank being required to comply 
with the State law where it has a physical office - and Appellee has cited none. 
Instead, Appellee insists on citing just the one sentence from Rule 9.7(d), and 
giving it an interpretation entirely inconsistent with the plaining meaning provided 
by the OCC. But the OCC's position could not be more clear. The OCC analysis 
continues: 
Moreover, we disagree that "location" for purposes of 
section 92a is appropriately determined by the presence 
of a main office or bank branch. As previously 
discussed, the Contravention Clause of section 92a 
requires that a bank look to the laws of the state in which 
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it acts in one or more fiduciary capacities in order to determine the 
limits on those capacities. 
Id. at *34794-95. 
To circumvent the plain import of this Rule, Appellee asserts that when 
ReconTrust conducts real estate foreclosures in Utah, it is really "acting" in a 
fiduciary capacity in Texas. But even ignoring the recording requirements of the 
Utah statutes for the notices necessary to maintain a foreclosure in Utah, how can 
Appellee and/or ReconTrust say that the actual sale of the property - which is 
conducted at the courthouse of the county in which the property is situated - is a 
fiduciary act occurring in Texas? In practical terms, the recording of notices are 
but incidental steps to completing a foreclosure. It is the actual auctioning of the 
property at the courthouse that culminates the foreclosure process - and even 
Appellee concedes that that act, for purposes of foreclosing a property in Utah, 
takes place in Utah. 
As Judge Jenkins said in Bell v. Countrywide, for ReconTrust to claim that it 
is acting in a fiduciary capacity in Texas when it exercises the trustee's power of 
sale in Utah is "fantasy." Bell, slip op., p. 24. 
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2. According to the OCC a Bank is Present in a State for 
Purposes of § 92a if it is "Merely Doing Business" in that 
State. 
In 2000, the OCC gave notice of proposed rulemaking for a new Rule 9.7. 
As stated by the OCC in the Federal Register, the purpose of that rule was to 
"codify" Interpretive Letters 695, 866, and 872. 65 FR 75872-01, 2000 WL 
1772315.9 
Interpretive Letter ("IL") 695 specifically addresses the very issue 
ReconTrust raises in this case. 1996 WL 187825. It says that a national bank 
merely doing business in a State is considered "present" in that State for purposes 
of § 92a, and therefore is subject to the laws of that State. Id. at * 13. In discussing 
the term "located" as used in § 92a, the OCC is very clear that Congress did not 
intend that the provisions of § 92a to mean that a national bank could attach itself 
to one State and then have that State's laws follow the bank wherever it operated 
nationwide. As the OCC states: 
Thus, in our view, with respect to a national bank that 
proposes to offer fiduciary services in more than one 
state, section 92a applies equally for each and every 
9ReconTrust has previously argued that Rule 9 supercedes IL 695. But in 
reality, Rule 9.7 is based on IL 695, along with ILs 866 and 872. IL 695 is an 18-
page legal opinion. Rule 9.7 is a one-page statement of the principles of the those 
ILs. 
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state. The use of a singular term in section 92a 
("whenever the laws of such state . .."; "the laws of the 
state in which the bank is located") does not imply that 
Congress intended that the provisions of section 92a 
would apply only to one state for each national bank. 
Id. at *12 (emphasis added.) 
The OCC's Interpretative Letter authoritatively states that a bank exercising 
fiduciary duties is subject to the law of the State in which it is conducting those 
fiduciary activities. Key to that understanding is the following: 
Thus, section 92a authorizes national banks to offer 
fiduciary services in multiple states, but then conditions 
the exercise of that power within each state on a state-
by-state basis under the same test: is the exercise of 
fiduciary powers by national banks prohibited by state 
law, and even if it is, does that state permit its state 
institutions to exercise these powers or not. This result 
is consistent with other banking statutes that treat a 
single national bank as present in different states for 
purposes of that statute. 
Id. at *12 (emphasis added). 
Citing a half-dozen court cases and prior OCC interpretive letters that hold 
that a bank is "located" in a State in which it is conducting its fiduciary activities, 
IL 695 applies the same legal principles to § 92a, declaring: 
In these other instances, just as with section 92a here, the 
statutes were similarly applied to the bank on a state-by-
state basis. The bank was considered present in each 
state - through a branch, another type of office, or merely 
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doing business - and treated under the statute in the same 
manner as any other national bank in the state. 
Id. at *13 (emphasis added). This interpretation, the OCC states, fosters "desirable 
public policies" because: 
First, every national bank offering fiduciary services in a 
given state will have the same authority to conduct 
fiduciary business. A national bank conducting fiduciary 
business and administering trust assets at a trust office 
will be subject to the same standards irrespective of 
whether the office is part of an in-state national bank or 
an out-of-state national bank. Second, there will be a 
level playing field for enhanced competition in the 
provision of fiduciary services within each state, because 
more potential providers will be able to compete on 
similar terms. 
Id. at *14 (emphasis added). 
So the questions to be asked here are: Is there a level playing field in Utah 
if a national bank headquartered in Texas follows Texas law when conducting its 
fiduciary activities in Utah, while national banks located in Utah must follow Utah 
law? Is it a level playing field when Utah State-chartered banks are expressly 
prohibited from conducting trust deed foreclosures, but national banks 
headquartered out-of-state are not? And what about national banks with offices in 
the State? Is it a level playing field if ReconTrust can conduct non-judicial real 
estate foreclosures in Utah, but national banks with offices in Utah cannot? 
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III. AVOIDING AN ABSURD RESULT 
Under ReconTrust's theory that its location should determine the law to be 
applied, creates an absurdity. Under that theory, it is conceivable that every 
State's trustees law applies to foreclosures in the State of Utah - except Utah's. 
ReconTrust has argued in cases in federal court here that, depending upon the 
case, either California or Texas law applies to foreclosures in Utah. But which? 
And does it matter? If a national bank is located in Illinois, and is conducting 
foreclosures in Utah, then under ReconTrust's theory Illinois' trustee law applies. 
Likewise for a national bank located in Florida. Under ReconTrust's theory, 
"making it easier for Utahns to meet with trustees" would not be a "legitimate state 
interest" of the State of Utah, see Kleinsmith, 571 F.3d at 1048, but rather the 
interest of the State of California, Texas, Illinois, Florida or some other State 
legislature - any State legislature but Utah's. Under that scenario, for the Utah 
legislature to attempt to "make it easier for Utahns to meet with trustees, who play 
a pivotal role in nonjudicial foreclosures," the Utah legislature would have to 
lobby the legislatures of California, Texas, Illinois, Florida. Under the theory 
being propounded by Appellee, every State except Utah would have jurisdiction 
over the qualifications of trustees conducting nonjudicial foreclosures in Utah. 
That is absurd. 
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CONCLUSION 
As this case pertains to the underlying issue regarding whether ReconTrust 
was a qualified trustee to conduct the foreclosure sale of Appellants Sundquist's 
home, this Court should declare that: 
1. Under the "State law condition" of §92a of the National Bank Act, Utah 
law governs the acts of national banks exercising fiduciary duties in the State of 
Utah, and 
2. ReconTrust is not a qualified trustee for purposes of conducting 
nonjudicial real estate foreclosure sales in the State of Utah. 
Dated this / f day of August, 2012. 
MARKL. SHURTLEFF 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
^o/< >/° 
JERROLD S. J^TSEN 
-'' Assistant Utah Attorney General 
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S T A T E OF U T A H 
O F F I C E OF THE ATTORNEY G E N E R A L 
MARK L. S H U R T L E F F 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
JOHN E. SWALLOW Protecting Utah • Protecting You KIRK TORGENSEN 
Chief Deputy Chief Deputy 
May 19,2011 
Brian T. Moynihan 
President, Bank of America 
lOONorthTryonSt 
Charlotte, NC 28255 
Re: ReconTrust Co., N.A. 
Dear Mr. Moynihan: 
As Attorney General for the State of Utah, I am statutorily charged with enforcing Utah's 
laws in the State of Utah. In that capacity I have determined that ReconTrust, N.A., is not in 
compliance with Utah Code §§ 57-1-21 and 57-1-23 when conducting real estate foreclosures in 
the State of Utah. 
Utah Code §§ 57-1-21(3) and 57-1-23 provide that the only valid trustees of trust deeds 
with the "power of sale" are those who are either members of the Utah State Bar or title 
insurance companies. Since ReconTrust is neither of these, all real estate foreclosures conducted 
by ReconTrust in the State of Utah are not in compliance with Utah's statutes, and are hence 
illegal. 
These code sections were passed by the Utah Legislature in 2001 and 2004 for the 
specific purpose of protecting Utah citizens in their homes when they are faced with the potential 
of a real estate foreclosure. The constitutionality of this legislation was ultimately upheld by the 
United States 10th Circuit Court of Appeals m Shurtleff v. Kleinsmith, 571 F.3d 1033 (2009). 
It is my understanding that ReconTrust claims that as a national bank it is exempt from 
following Utah law in exercising its fiduciary powers. This office adamantly disagrees with that 
position on the basis that the section of the National Bank Act granting national banks authority 
to act in a fiduciary capacity specifically states that such authority shall be exercised only "when 
not in contravention of State or local law." 12 U.S.C. 92a(a) and (b). 
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Brian T. Moynihan 
President, Bank of America 
May 19. 2011 
Page Two of Two 
Thus, ReconTrust's exercise of fiduciary powers in the State of Utah is a violation not 
only of State law, but also applicable federal law. 
The purpose of this letter is to give you notice that the Utah Attorney General's office 
intends to enforce Utah's statutes against those conducting business in Utah, and that includes 
enforcement of the real estate trustee qualification statute. I would appreciate a response to this 
letter from you within 30 days of the date of this letter informing me of how you intend to 
proceed. I am willing to discuss this issue with you or your attorneys if you like. 
Sincerely, 
arkL. Shurtleff 
tah Attorney General 
MLS/se 
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NEWS 
RELEASE 
Protecting Utah # Protecting You 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
MARK SHURTLEFF 
For Immediate Release 
February 9, 2012 
Contact 
Paul Murphy, A.G's Office: 
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UTAH JOINS $25 BILLION MORTGAGE 
SETTLEMENT OVER FORECLOSURE MISDEEDS 
UTAH GETS ESTIMATED $171 MILLION FROM AGREEMENT 
Utah Attorney General Mark Shurtleff and Utah Governor Gary R. Herbert announced a 
landmark $25 billion joint federal-state agreement today with the nation's five largest mortgage 
servicers over foreclosure abuses and fraud and unacceptable nationwide mortgage servicing 
practices. 
The proposed agreement provides an estimated $171,115,273 in total benefits to the state 
of Utah. The total includes an estimated $45 million in direct relief to Utah homeowners and $102 
million indirect relief and addresses future mortgage loan servicing practices. The state will receive 
direct payment of $22,987,615. 
"This is the second largest settlement ever by the states and addresses serious misconduct 
against homeowners in Utah and other states," says Shurtleff. "This agreement provides relief to 
homeowners and also stops the outrageous conduct that led to the mortgage crisis." 
"I commend the diligence and hard work of Utah's Attorney General and his staff to right 
a wrong," says Governor Herbert. "We hope those affected by the foreclosure crisis will take 
advantage of the programs and resources available through this settlement. I hope this sends a 
message that this kind of fraudulent conduct is not tolerated." 
U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder, U.S. Housing and Urban Development (HUD) 
Secretary Shaun Donovan and a bipartisan group of state attorneys general announced the 
national settlement today in Washington, D.C. 
Utah borrowers who lost their home to foreclosure from January 1, 2008 through 
December 31, 2011 and suffered servicing abuse would qualify. Approximately 23% of Utah 
homes are now underwater. 
The unprecedented joint state-federal settlement is the result of a massive civil law 
enforcement investigation and initiative that includes state attorneys general and state banking 
regulators across the country, and nearly a dozen federal agencies. The settlement holds 
banks accountable for past mortgage servicing and foreclosure fraud and abuses and provides 
relief to homeowners. With the backing of a federal court order and the oversight of an 
independent monitor, the settlement stops future fraud and abuse. 
Under the agreement, the five servicers have agreed to a $25 billion penalty under a 
joint state-national settlement structure 
Here are highlights of the settlement: 
Servicers commit a minimum of $17 billion directly to borrowers through a series of Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law Sc o l, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-more-
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national homeowner relief effort options, including principal reduction. Given how the 
settlement is structured, servicers will actually provide up to an estimated $32 billion in 
direct homeowner relief. 
Servicers commit $3 billion to a mortgage refinancing program for borrowers who are 
current, but owe more than their home is currently worth. 
Servicers pay $5 billion to the states and federal government ($4.25 billion to the states 
and $750 million to the federal government). The state payments include funding for 
payments to borrowers for mortgage servicing abuse. 
Homeowners receive comprehensive new protections from new mortgage loan servicing 
and foreclosure standards. 
An independent monitor will ensure mortgage servicer compliance. 
Government can pursue civil claims outside of the agreement, any criminal case; 
borrowers and investors can pursue individual, institutional or class action cases 
regardless of agreement. 
The settlement does not grant any immunity from criminal offenses and will not affect 
criminal prosecutions. The agreement does not prevent homeowners or investors from 
pursuing individual, institutional or class action civil cases against the five servicers. The pact 
also enables state attorneys general and federal agencies to investigate and pursue other 
aspects of the mortgage crisis, including securities cases. 
"This agreement addresses some breakdowns in the mortgage servicing industry but 
still allows us to go after other misdeeds," says Chief Deputy Attorney General John Swallow. 
"Significantly, those who are still underwater in their homes could be eligible for principal 
reductions and loan modifications that would not otherwise be available had we gone to trial." 
The final agreement, through a consent judgment, will be filed later in U.S. District Court 
in Washington, D.C., and will have the authority of a court order. 
Because of the complexity of the mortgage market and this agreement, which will span 
a three year period, in some cases participating mortgage servicers will contact borrowers 
directly regarding loan modification options. However, borrowers should contact their mortgage 
servicer to obtain more information about specific loan modification programs and whether they 
qualify under terms of this settlement. Settlement administrators or state attorneys general may 
also contact borrowers regarding certain aspects of the settlement. 
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION 
* * * * * * * * * 
TIMOTHY R. BELL, an individual; and ) 
JENNIFER BELL, an individual, ) Civil No. 2:11-CV-00271-BSJ 
Plaintiffs, ) MEMORANDUM OPINION 
) & ORDER 
vs. ) (Fed. R. Civ P. 12(b)(6)) 
COUNTRYWIDE BANK, N.A. d/b/a 
BANK OF AMERICA CORPORATION, 
a Delaware corporation; BAC HOME 
LOANS SERVICING, LP, a Texas 
limited partnership; RECONTRUST 
COMPANY, N.A, a national association; 
and DOES 1-5, 
Defendants. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This matter arises out of plaintiffs' alleged default on a promissory note secured by a deed 
of trust on their primary residence. On October 8,2009, defendant ReconTrust, a successor 
trustee, recorded with the Salt Lake County Recorder a notice of default and election to sell 
plaintiffs' property to collect on the note.1 Plamtiffs filed a complaint challenging the prospective 
sale in Third District Court, Salt Lake County, Utah. Defendants subsequently removed the case 
to this court, alleging diversity. 
At a hearing on August 30, 2011, plaintiffs represented that they "would like to bring an 
amended complaint seeking judicial determination about the right of ReconTrust [the successor 
\See Pis.' Third Am. Compl, filed Sept. 15, 2011 (dkt. no. 68) ("Pis.' Compl."), at Ex. 
C.) 
FILED 
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trustee] to foreclose this trust deed."2 Plaintiffs also requested leave to amend the complamt to 
state a cause of action for promissory estoppel on the loan modification issues.3 At that time, 
plaintiffs stated that "as to those two items, we'd like the Court's leave to -file an amended 
complaint and continue on our way."4 The court granted leave to amend/ ordering that plaintiffs 
file their amended complaint by September 16, 2011.6 
Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on September 15, 2011/ which asserted the 
following among other things: (1) absence of authority of ReconTrust and "prehminary 
injunction" (as against all defendants), (2) breach of an alleged modified contract (as against 
BAC and BAC Servicing), and (3) promissory estoppel (as against BAC and BAC Servicing). 
On September 30, 2011, defendants filed a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to 
state a claim,8 arguing that the complaint exceeded the authorization to amend. Although 
defendants assert that plaintiffs' claim for prehminary injunction "is not a claim at all but rather a 
2(Transcript of Hearing, dated Aug. 30, 2011 (dkt. no. 77) (££Mot Amend Hr'g Tr."), at 
5:7-9; see also id. at 6:11-13.) 
3(Mat5:19-22) 
\ld. at 5:23-24.) 
5(/<f. at 22:19-20.) 
%See id. at 23:17-24:9; Order, filed September 21, 2011 (dkt no. 69).) 
7(See Pis.' Compl.) Plaintiffs titled the amended complaint as "Third Amended 
Complaint" when in fact it should have been titled "Second Amended Complaint" Although on 
May 31, 2011 plaintiffs filed a motion to amend/correct their first amended complaint (dkt. no. 
36),—and filed concurrently therewith a proposed second amended complaint (dkt. no. 38)—the 
court never granted that motion to amend. Accordingly, the proposed second amended complaint 
was never operative, and what plaintiffs have titled as the "Third Amended Complaint" is 
actually the "Second Amended Complaint." 
\See Defs.' Mot. Dismiss Pis.' Third Am. Compl, filed Sept 30, 2011 (dkt. no. 70) 
("Defs.' Mot. Dismiss").) 
2 
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form of relief that cannot constitute an independent cause of action/'9 paragraphs 52-56 of the 
amended pleading adequately raise the question as to whether ReconTrust has authority to 
conduct nonjudicial foreclosures on real property in Utah. 
The question is of continuing importance because Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-23.5(2) (Supp. 
2011)10 provides a private cause of action to a trustor whose real property has been the subject of 
an unauthorized sale by an unauthorized person. Plaintiffs assert ReconTrust is unauthorized to 
"foreclose." 
Defendants may have a point that plaintiffs may have exceeded the scope of the court's 
leave to amend,11 but the court need not address the promissory estoppel claim nor the breach of 
contract issue at this time. The immediate and substantive question before the court is whether 
ReconTrust has authority to sell real property at a nonjudicial foreclosure sale in Utah. 
On November 10, 2011, defendants' motion came on for hearing and was argued to the 
court, at which time the court reserved on the matter and requested supplemental briefing from 
both parties as to the legislative history of 12 U.S.C. § 92a. Curiously, at the hearing, defendants 
notified the court for the first time that on November 2, 2011, ReconTrust had been succeeded as 
-trustee by an attorney named Armand J. Howell.12 Defendants then asserted that plaintiffs' claim 
\See Defs/ Mem. Supp. Mot Dismiss Pis.' Third Am. Compl. (diet. no. 71) ("Defs.' 
Mem."), at 2) 
10Subsection (2)(a) states that "[a]n authorized person who conducts an unauthorized sale 
is liable to the trustor for the actual damages suffered by the trustor as a result of the 
unauthorized sale or $2,000, whichever is greater." 
1I(5'^ Defs.'Mem. at 5-6.) 
12(Transcript of Hearing, dated Nov. 10, 2011 (dkt no. 80) ("Mot Dismiss Hr'g Tr."), at 
7:16-8:5,33:17-19.) 
3 
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as to ReconTrust had become moot13 In light of Mr. Howell's recent appointment as successor 
trustee, the court also requested the parties to brief whether the ReconTrust issue was capable of 
repetition.14 
n. DISCUSSION 
At this point, the court need only determine whether to grant or deny defendants' motion 
to dismiss. 
"While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed 
factual allegations, a plaintiffs obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief 
requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause 
of action will not do."15 While "the pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require detailed 
factual allegations,... it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-
me accusation."16 
Prior to dealing with the substantive question, the court must first determine whether 
plaintiffs5 claim is now moot. 
A. Plaintiffs' claim against ReconTrust is not moot 
This court's jurisdiction and constitutional authority under Article III of the Constitution 
do not extend to moot cases, but only to actual cases or controversies.17 The mootness doctrine is 
l\Id. at 33:12-16.) 
14(K at 72:22-73:3.) 
15BellAtL Coiy. v. Twombty, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal citations and quotations 
omitted). 
16Ashcroftv. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct 1937,1949 (2009) (internal quotations omitted). 
11
 Iron Arrow Honor Soc y v. Heckler, 464 U.S. 67, 70 (1983). 
4 
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grounded in the idea that "'federal courts only decide actual, ongoing cases or controversies,'"18 
and that "a case or controversy no longer exists when it is impossible to grant any effectual 
relief."19 
However, a case is not moot if it "falls within a special category of disputes that are 
'capable of repetition' while 'evading review.5"20 Two elements must be present for a case to fall 
within this exception: "(1) the challenged action was in its duration too short to be fully litigated 
prior to its cessation or expiration, and (2) there was a reasonable expectation that the same 
complaining party would be subjected to the same action again."21 
The Supreme Court has stated that a federal court's "concern in these cases, as in all 
others involving potentially moot claims, [is] whether the controversy [is] capable of repetition 
and not . . . whether the claimant ha[s] demonstrated that a recurrence of the dispute was more 
probable than not."22 Indeed, the possibility of recurrence need not be "established with 
mathematical precision," but rather the court need only find a "reasonable expectation" of 
repetition.23 Certainly, the bar is not high for a party to withstand a challenge for mootness. 
nLucero v. Bureau of Collection Recovery, Inc., 639 F.3d 1239, 1242 (10th Cir. 2011) 
(quoting Building & Constr. Dep 't v. Rockwell Intl Corp., 1 F.3d 1487, 1491 (10th Cir. 1993)); 
see also Matthew I. Hall, The Partially Prudential Doctrine ofMootness, 11 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 
562, 571 (2009). 
]9Chihuahuan Grasslands Alliance v. Kempthome, 545 F.3d 884, 891 (10th Cir. 2008). 
20Turnerv. Rogers, 131 S. Ct 2507, 2514-15 (2011) (quotings'. Pac. Terminal Co. v. 
ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911)). 
2lWeinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147,149 (1975) (per curiam). 
22Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 319 n.6 (1988) (emphasis in original). 
5 
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When presented with a question of mootness the court also has an "interest m 'preventing 
litigants from attempting to manipulate the Court's jurisdiction."'24 "The concern is that a parry's 
change in position may be temporary and thus abandoned once the litigation ends."25 Therefore, 
it is "well settled that a defendant's voluntary cessation of a challenged practice does not deprive 
a federal court of its power to determine the legality of the practice "26 In cases where the court is 
concerned with a party's potential manipulation of the court's jurisdiction, the Tenth Circuit 
looks at two additional factors. (1) whether "it is not 'absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful 
behavior could not reasonably be expected to recurf,]5"27 and (2) whether the litigant is 
attempting to seal a favorable decision from review.28 
Additionally, there are certain matters that come before a court that are too important to 
be denied effective review; for example, when the nature of the issue is sufficiently compelling in 
relation to the enforcement of the laws and the private rights involved.29 
^Wyoming v. U.S. Dep }t ofAgric, 414 F.3d 1207, 1212 (10th Cir. 2005) (quoting City of 
Erie v. PAP'S A M, 529 U.S. 277, 288 (2000)). 
*I<L 
26City ofMesquite v. Alladin 's Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 289 (1982). JnAlladin's Castle, 
a city exempted a business from a city ordinance in response to the business' challenge that the 
ordinance was unconstitutional. However, after a state court decision was issued regarding the 
matter, the city adopted a new ordinance which repealed the business exemption. See id. at 
286-87,289. 
21
 Seneca-Cayuga Tribe ofOkla. v. Natl Indian Gaming Comm'n, 327 F.3d 1019, 1028 
(10th Cir. 2003) (quoting S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Norton, 301 F.3d 1217, 1236 n.17 (10th 
Cir. 2002)). 
nSee Seneca-Cayuga Tribe, 327 F 3d at 1029 ("We, however, read City of Erie as 
expressing a generahzed concern about manipulation of an appellate court's jurisdiction to seal a 
favorable decision from review. Here, appellees' conduct, while presumably not in bad faith, 
nonetheless implicates the concern over post-trial manipulation."). 
29Cf In re Carlson, 580 F.2d 1365, 1372 (10th Cir. 1978) (deciding to entertain the issue 
(continued...) 
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Here, defendants assert that "Plaintiffs cannot allege a live case or controversy vis-a-vis 
ReconTrust and this Court cannot grant Plaintiffs any effectual relief as to the preliminary 
injunction claim"30 because ReconTrust is no longer the trustee on the plaintiffs' deed of trust, 
and "in fact, ReconTrust ceased operations in Utah m October 2011 "31 
This court disagrees The question of mootness arose on November 2, 2011, when 
defendants substituted a licensed Utah attorney as trustee m the place of ReconTrust However, 
plaintiffs and others are certainly capable of being subjected to ReconTrust5 s actions once again 
Plaintiffs correctly assert that the "beneficiary may appoint a successor trustee at any time"32 
meaning that there is nothing prohibiting defendants from again substituting ReconTrust as 
successor trustee at a later date 
Although defendants represent that ReconTrust ceased operations in Utah in October 
2011, they have supplied this court with one order and one memorandum decision and order 
from cases m the Distnct of Utah wherein ReconTrust continued to prosecute actions against 
Utah homeowners as late as December 2011 and February 2012 j3 There was no specific 
representation that ReconTrust would comply with the Utah statutes m the future It is of course 
79( continued) 
as to whether the district court's judgment denying the IRS application was a final decision even 
though the petitioner's business successor-in-interest had already voluntarily paid all the taxes, 
penalties, and mterest of taxpayer Carlson) 
30(Defs ' Supplemental Mem Supp Mot Dismiss, filed Dec 1, 2011 ("Defs.9 
Supplemental Mem ") (dkt no 83), at 8 ) 
32Utah Code Aim § 57-l-22(l)(a) (2010) (emphasis added) 
32Dutcher v Matheson, 2 11-CV-666-TS (D Utah Feb 8, 2012) (Mem Opinion & Order, 
dkt no 48), see also Garrett v ReconTrust Co,NA,2 11-CV-00763-DS (D Utah Dec 21, 
2011) (Order, dkt no 9) 
7 
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curious that ReconTrust later provided to the court supplemental authority and further argued that 
ReconTrust did not have to comply with the Utah statutes. Thus, it is not absolutely clear to this 
court that ReconTrust's future compliance with Utah statutes can reasonably be expected. 
ReconTrust relies on two decisions which apply Texas law to a national bank's fiduciary 
activities in Utah.3* The cases on this issue within the District of Utah are evenly split.35 One of 
them was appealed.36 The Tenth Circuit did not have opportunity to pass on the matter because 
the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed her complaint in the underlying action prior to the Tenth 
Circuit having opportunity to issue an opinion.37 
The substitution of an attorney as successor trustee occurred on November 2, 2011. The 
hearing on the motion to dismiss was set for November 10, 2011. Despite having eight days (four 
days, not including weekends and the dates of substitution and hearing) to notify the court of the 
substitution—and possibly submit a supplemental brief as to the potential mootness 
34Dutcher v. Matheson, 2:11-CV-666-TS (D. Utah Feb. 8, 2012) (Mem. Opinion & Order, 
dkt no. 48); see also Garrett v. ReconTrust Co., N.A, 2:11-CV-00763-DS (D. Utah Dec. 21, 
2011) (Order, dkt.no. 9). 
35
 Just as there are two District of Utah cases that apply Texas law to ReconTrust's 
foreclosure operations in Utah, see cases cited supra note 34, there are also two District of Utah 
cases that apply Utah law on the same issue. See Cox v. ReconTrust Co., No. 2:10-CV-492-CW, 
2011 WL 835893, at *6 (D. Utah March 3, 2011) (holding that Utah law applies to ReconTrust's 
foreclosure activities within the State of Utah); see also Coleman v. ReconTrust Co., No. 2:10-
CV-1099 (D. Utah Oct. 3,2011) (Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Motion to Dismiss, 
dkt. no. 87, at 2) (same). 
36See Cox v. ReconTrust Co., No. 2:10-CV-492-CW (D. Utah June 25,2010) (Notice of 
Appeal of Interlocutory Decision, dkt. no. 47). 
31
 See Cox v. ReconTrust Co., N.A., No. 10-4117, Order at 2 (10th Cir. Aug. 18, 2011). 
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issue—defendants did not notify the court of the substitution-until the November 10, 2011 
hearing was well underway and 24538 days after the case was commenced.39 
The parties have raised a compelling question. Further, the private rights of many Utah 
citizens are potentially involved. The matter is too important to be denied effective review. 
B. ReconTrust is not authorized to exercise a power of sale in a non-judicial 
foreclosure action within the State of Utah 
• Utah statutes require banks—including Utah-chartered banks—to foreclose trust deeds 
only through identified trustees. The question for decision is direct: Does ReconTrust, a Texas 
corporation, and by definition a "national bank"—although it neither takes deposits nor makes 
loans—have the power to conduct non-judicial foreclosures in Utah of trust deeds on real. 
property located in Utah without complying with Utah statutes? The direct answer is no. It does 
not have such power. . . 
38Plaintiffs filed their complaint in Third District Court, Salt Lake County, Utah on March 
11,2011, 
3\See Mot; Dismiss Hr'g Tr. at 7:16-24, 33:12-23): 
MS. MILLER: In any event, a new substitution of trustee has been made since that 
time identifying another trustee.... 
THE COURT: When was that done? 
MS. MILLER: That was done in November of 2011. 
THE COURT: Just a'day or two ago. 
MS. MILLER: A week or two ago, yes. 
' MS. MILLER: We5d also like to point out that there is no immediate or 
irreparable injury in this case. ReconTrust is not even the appointed substitute 
trustee anymore, as we pointed out earlier, so the issue is moot— 
THE COURT: Why so fast? I notice that you did that on the 2d of November. 
MS. MILLER: Yes. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MS. MILLER: Yes. The old notice was stale. We would not have been able to act 
on the old notice. And so a new notice was issued. 
9 
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A state bank which seeks to foreclose on real property in Utah must comply with Utah 
law. A federally chartered "bank" which seeks to foreclose on such property must comply with 
Utah'law as well. The reason is found within the federal statutes, the history of federal 
legislation, as well as principles of Federalism. 
Defendants—and the court decisions to which they cite40—rely heavily on 12 C.F.R. § 
9.7(d) (2011), a final interpretive rule issued by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 
("the Comptroller")" which interprets the governing federal statute, 12 U.S.C.A. § 92a (2001). 
However, none of the decisions to which defendants cite—nor any that this court has 
examined—have questioned whether the Comptroller's interpretation deserves deference.41 
In determining whether the court should give such deference to the Comptroller's 
interpretation of § 92a of the National Bank Act the court applies the Chevron test, which states 
that 
[w]hen a court reviews an agency's construction of the statute which it 
administers, it is confronted with two questions. First, always, is the question 
whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent 
of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the 
agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, 
however, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise 
question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on the 
statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation. 
Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the 
^Butcher v. Matheson, 2:11-CV-666-TS (D. Utah Feb. 8, 2012) (Mem. Opinion & Order, 
dkt. no. 48); see also Garrett v. ReconTrust Co., KA, 2:11-CV-00763-DS (D. Utah Dec. 21, 
2011) (Order, dkt. no. 9). Both the preceding cases held that Texas law applies to ReconTrust's 
foreclosure activities in Utah. But see Cox v. ReconTrust Co., No. 2:10-CV-492-CW, 2011 WL 
835893, at.*6 (D. Utah March 3, 2011) (holding that Utah law applies to ReconTrust's 
foreclosure activities within the State of Utah); see also Coleman v. ReconTmst Co., No. 2:10-
CV-1099 (D. Utah Oct. 3,2011) (Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Motion to Dismiss, 
dkt.no. 87, at 2) (same). 
41
 See Chevron, U.S.A, Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984). 
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question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible 
construction of the statute.42 
In a more recent case, the Supreme Court has stated that "[u]nder the familiar Chevron 
framework, we defer to an agency's reasonable interpretation of a statute it is charged with 
administering.5'43 
Accordingly, in determining whether the Comptroller's opinion deserves deference, the 
court first looks to whether Congress has addressed the precise question at issue, and if Congress 
has not, the court will then determine whether the Comptroller's interpretation is based on a 
permissible construction of the statute, i.e., whether the interpretation is reasonable. 
1. The interplay between 12 U.S.C. § 92a and 12 C.F.R. § 9.7(d) 
ReconTrust is chartered as a "national bank," and is governed by the National Bank Act, 
12 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. As part of the National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 92a specifically discusses a 
national bank's power to act as trustee. Because the Comptroller's final rule purports to interpret 
12 U.S.C. § 92a, this court's starting point is the plain language of the statute itself. Pertinent 
also is the intent of Congress as reflected in. the language of the statute and its legislative history. 
The statute states: 
(a) Authority of Comptroller of the Currency . -
The Comptroller of the Currency shall be authorized and empowered to grant by 
special permit to national banks applying therefor, when not in contravention of 
State or local law, the right to act as trustee, executor, administrator, registrar of 
stocks and bonds, guardian of estates, assignee, receiver, committee of estates of 
lunatics, or in any other fiduciary capacity in which State banks, trust companies, 
or other corporations which come into competition with national banks are 
permitted to act under the laws of the State in which the national bank is located. 
(b) Grant and exercise of powers deemed notin contravention of State or local law 
A2Id. at 842-43. 
* Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass'n, 129 S. Ct. 2710, 2715 (2009) (emphasis added). 
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Whenever the laws of such State authorize or permit the exercise of any or all of 
the foregoing powers by State banks, trust companies, or other corporations which 
compete with national banks, the granting to and the exercise of such powers by 
national banks shall not be deemed to be in contravention of State or local law 
within the meaning of this section.44 
Congress has spoken directly to this issue: the "State" referenced in § 92a refers, inter 
alia, to the State where the trust activity occurs—Utah in this case. The statute is clear. However, 
even if the statute is not clear and demands interpretation, this Court concludes that the • 
Comptroller's interpretation in 12 C.F.R. § 9.7(d) modifies the statute and is unreasonable—if 
not irrational—and therefore, does not deserve deference. ReconTrust must comply with Utah 
law when engaging in trust activities within the State of Utah, which includes trust deed 
foreclosures. This court further concludes that ReconTrust, by definition a national bank, 
competes with banks, not title insurance companies. Rather, the Utah Legislature intended that 
title insurance companies and national or state-chartered banks work in concert with each other 
when conducting non-judicial foreclosures within the State of Utah. 
Defendants argue that § 92a must be read in conjunction with 12 C.F.R. § 9.7(d) (2011), 
which states that 
[fjor each fiduciary relationship, the state referred to in section 92a is the state in 
which the bank acts in a fiduciary capacity for that relationship. A national bank 
acts in a fiduciary capacity hi the state in which it accepts the fiduciary 
appointment, executes the documents that create the fiduciary relationship, and 
makes discretionary decisions regarding the investment or distribution of fiduciary 
assets. If these activities take place in more than one state, then the state in which 
the bank acts in.a fiduciary capacity for section 92a purposes is the state that the 
bank designates from among those states.45 
12U.S.C.A. § 92a(a)-{b) (2001) (emphasis added). 
12 C.F.R. § 9.7(d) (2011). 
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Defendants assert that when read in conjunction with 12 C.F.R. § 9.7(d), the "State or 
- local law" referred to in 12 U.S.C. § 92a(a). is clearly Texas law—as opposed to Utah 
law—because ReconTrust accepts fiduciary appointment, executes the documents that create the 
fiduciary relationship, and makes discretionary decisions regarding the investment or distribution 
of fiduciary assets in Texas. Defendants have called the court's attention to two recent 
decisions—both within the District of Utah—which arrive at this conclusion, relying on 12 
C.F.R. § 9.7(d).46 Although aware of these decisions, this court sees the issue differently. 
Texas law allows national banks to act as trustee under deeds of trust, and to exercise the 
power of sale with regard to such deeds of trust in Texas.47 Utah law does not.48 Because Texas 
law allows its own state-chartered banks to exercise the power of sale in foreclosure actions in 
Texas, pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 92a, national banks are also allowed to exercise the power of sale 
within Texas. However, because Utah law does not allow Utah state-chartered banks to exercise 
the power of sale in foreclosure actions, plaintiffs argue that § 92a's contravention clause ("when 
not in contravention of State or local law") also prohibits national banks from exercising the 
power of sale in Utah. 
The threshold issue is whether the court should give credence to 12 C.F.R. § 9.7(d)'s • 
reading of 12 U.S.C. § 92a, as the defendants insist 
46Dutcher v. Matheson, 2:11-CV-666-TS (D. Utah Feb. 8,2012) (Mem. Decision & 
Order, dkt no. 48, at 11 n.25); see also Garrett v. ReconTrust Co., N.A., 2:ll-CV-00763-DS (D. 
Utah Dec. 21, 2011) (Order, dkt. no. 9, at 3). 
A1See Tex. Fin. Code Ann. §§ 32.001,182.001; see also Tex. Prop. Code Ann. §§ 
51.0001,51.0074. . 
AZSee Utah Code Ann. §§ 57-1-23, 57-1-21 (2010) (allowing only an active member of the 
Utah State Bar or a title insurance company to exercise the power of sale). 
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(a) Whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue 
The precise question at issue is this: to which "State(s)" does 12 U.S.C. § 92a(a) refer? 
After carefully examining the statute's plain meaning, together with the legislative history of the 
statute, the court has determined that Congress has directly addressed this precise question. 
The court begins its analysis by looking to the plain meaning of the statute.49 "The 
plainness or ambiguity of statutory language is determined by reference to the language itself, the 
specific context in which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a 
whole.5550 12 U.S.C. § 92a(a) sets forth the Comptroller's authority to grant national banks the 
power to act as trustee "when not in contravention of State or local law." The State law to which 
§ 92a(a) refers is the law "of the State in which the national bank is located."51 Subsection (b) 
further states that "whenever the laws of such State authorize" State banks to act as trustee, the 
granting of such trustee powers to national banks "shall not be deemed to be in contravention of 
State or local law."*2 
The statute's plain meaning indicates that the national bank is "located" in each state in 
which it carries on activities as trustee. 
The Comptroller's rule—without providing reasons therefor—limits its interpretation of 
the location where a national bank acts as- trustee to the State in which the bank performs its 
^Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340'(1997) ("Our first step in interpreting a 
statute is to determine whether the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning with 
regard to the particular dispute in the case. Our inquiry must cease if the statutory language is 
unambiguous and 'the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent.'" (quoting United States v. 
Ron Paw Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 240 (1989))). 
5QRobinson,5\9XJ.S.zt34l. 
5112U.S.CA. § 92a(a) (2001). • 
52/J. § 92a(b). 
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"core fiduciary functions."53 The Comptroller has interpreted "core fiduciary functions" to mean 
"accepting] the fiduciary appointment, executing] the documents that create the fiduciary 
relationship, and mak[ing] discretionary decisions regarding the investment or distribution of 
fiduciary assets."54 Notably, the Comptroller failed to include as a core fiduciary function 
engaging in an act which liquidates the trust assets, e.g., engaging in a non-judicial foreclosure of 
real property where the trust asset is located. This makes no sense 
Such an artificial exclusion contravenes the plain meaning of the statute. When acting as 
a trustee of a trust deed, one necessarily acts in the capacity as trustee in the State where the real 
property is located, where notice of default is filed, and where the sale is conducted. In this case, 
ReconTrust is acting as trustee of a trust deed for real property in the State of Utah. ReconTrust, 
as trustee, filed a notice of default and'election to foreclose on real property within the State of 
Utah. 
The notice is filed in Utah. The sale is conducted in Utah, often on the steps of the local 
county courthouse.. Those acts do not occur in Texas. Those acts may not be performed by Utah-
chartered banks. Thus, those acts may not be performed by national banks in Utah. That dual 
system, it seems to me, is Federalism at its most elementary. 
Other courts have also reached this conclusion. In Cox v. ReconTrust Co., N.A.,55 the 
court stated that it was not convinced by 
51
 See Interpretive Letter No. 866, 1999 WL 983923, at Part HB. (October 8, 1999). 
5412 C.F.R. § 9.7(d) (2011); see also Interpretive Letter No. 866, 1999-WL 983923, at 
Part H.B. (adopted in substance by 12 C.F.R. § 9.7(d)). 
55No. 2.T0-CV-492 CW, 2011 WL 835893, at *6 (D. Utah March 3, 2011). Plaintiff 
voluntarily dismissed the underlying district court action while the foregoing case was on appeal 
before the Tenth Circuit. Thus, the Tenth Circuit found that the appeal was rendered moot. Cox v. 
ReconTrust Co., N.A., No. 10-4117, Order at 2 (10th Cir. Aug. 18, 2011). Currently, this case 
and the companion Utah cases all are a form of repetition. 
15 
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ReconTrust's argument that § 92a(b) dictates that the court look to some state law 
other than Utah state law to evaluate ReconTrust's foreclosure activities in Utah.. 
. . Here, . .; ReconTnist is conducting foreclosure activities on behalf of Bank of 
America in several states, including Utah. . . , 
Under a straight forward reading of § 92a(b), this court must look to Utah 
law in its analysis of whether ReconTrust's activities in Utah exceed 
ReconTrust's trustee powers. The powers granted to ReconTnist under federal law 
in this case are limited by the powers granted by Utah state law to ReconTrust's 
competitors. Accordingly, the extent of ReconTrust's federal powers must be 
determined by reference to the laws of Utah, not by reference to the laws of some 
other state. Under Utah law, the power to conduct non-judicial foreclosure is 
limited to attorneys and title companies. The scope of the powers granted by 
federal law is limited to the same power Utah statute confers on ReconTrust's 
Utah competitors.. . ,56 
The legislative history of 12 U.S.C. § 92a demonstrates that Utah law should apply. 
The phrase, "when not in contravention of State or local law" originated with § 1 l(k) of 
the Federal Reserve Act of 1913.57 Although legislative history does not exist as to the precise 
meaning of the phrase in § 1 l(k), a nearly identical phrase was used in § 8 of the same Act. 
Section 8 provided a means by which state banks could convert to national banks. However, the 
section placed a condition on state banks that desired to convert to national banks: "Provided, 
however, That said conversion shall not be in contravention of the State law."58 When the bill 
which eventually became the Federal Reserve Act of 1913 was introduced on the floor of the 
Senate on December 1, 1913, § 8 also contained the word "local" so as to read, "Provided, 
56Id.; see also Coleman v. ReconTrust Co., No. 2:10-CV-1099 (D. Utah Oct. 3, 2011) 
(Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Motion to Dismiss, dkt. no. 87, at 2) (u[T]he court 
agrees with the reasoning applied in Cox v. ReconTrust Company, N.A., 2011 WL 835893 
(March3, 2011 D.Utah)."). 
57Federal Reserve Act of 1913, Dec. 23, 1913, ch. 6 § 1 l(k), 38 Stat. 262. At the time of 
its passage, section 1 l(k) stated that "[t]he Federal Reserve Board shall be authorized and 
empowered To grant by special permit to national banks applying therefor, when not in 
contravention of State or local law, the right to act as trustee, executor, administrator, or registrar 
of stocks and bonds under such rules and regulations as the said board may prescribe." 
58 lId. § 8, 38 Stat 258. 
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however, That said acts are not in contravention of the State or local law."59 That wording of § 8 
is almost identical to the language found in § 1 l(k) that now exists as 12 U.S.C. § 92a(a). 
Dialogue as to the purpose of this language that occurred on the floor of the Senate on 
December 15, 1913 proves instructive: 
MR. BURTON: On page 28, lines 6 and 7, there is this proviso: 
Provided, however, That said acts are not in contravention of the State, or 
local law. 
Why should this reservation appear in the preceding section and 
not in section 9? The preceding section pertains to a change in the form of 
organization from a State bank to a national bank, while this section, as I 
have already said, relates to membership by a State bank in this new 
system. Why is not a reservation of that kind equally as necessary in this 
section as in the preceding section? 
MR. OWEN: Mr. President, I will reply to the Senator that, in my 
judgment, it is not necessary in the preceding section. 
MR. BURTON: That is, it goes without saying? 
MR. OWEN: It is merely put in as a courteous observation. In 
, reality I do not think it is actually necessary, because no State bank having 
its charter under a State law could violate the law of its own being. It was 
thought welly however, to put it in to show that there was no purpose on 
the part of Congress to disregard the local State law, but merely to give its 
assent provided the State law permitted it to be done.60 
Senator Owen's61 response is a clear indication that Congress did not intend to disregard 
or contravene local State law when giving state banks the opportunity to convert to national 
banks. That is to say, if State law prohibited a state bank from converting to a national bank, the 
5951 Cong. Rec. S23 (December 1, 1913) (statement of Sen. Owen). 
6051 Cong. Rec. S879 (December 15, 1913) (statements of Sens'. Owen& Burton) 
(emphasis added). 
6lSenator Owen was the Senate's principal sponsor of the Federal Reserve Act of 19.13. 
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Federal Reserve Act would not contravene that State's law, and the state bank would not be able 
to convert to a national bank. 
In light of the near-identical nature of the phrases in §§ 8 and 1 l(k), it seems clear that 
Congress intended to preclude any inference that a national bank- may disregard local State law in 
performing its duties as trustee. A contrary interpretation draws precisely that inference arid 
effectively preempts the laws of the local State (presumably the State where the foreclosed 
property is located and the trustee executes the power of sale) in favor of the laws of another 
State (the State where the national bank performs its "core fiduciary functions"); this is 
essentially the effect of the Comptroller's final rule. 
Shortly after the enactment of the Federal Reserve Act of 1913, the Supreme Court had 
opportunity to interpret § 11 (k) when the Michigan Supreme Court upheld a state law that 
prohibited national banks from exercising trust powers within Michigan.62 Interestingly, the laws 
of Michigan allowed state banks to exercise trust powers;63 thus the effect of the Michigan law 
was to discriminate against national banks. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the 
Michigan Supreme Court,64 holding that if State law allows a state bank to conduct certain 
business, the State must also allow a national bank to conduct that same business, so long, as the 
Federal Reserve Board grants the national bank permission to do so.6:> 
*
2First Natl Bank ofBay City v. Fellows, 244 U.S. 416, 421-22 (1917). 
63Id. at 421. 
"Id. at 423-24. 
6 5Kat426. 
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The next year, Congress successfully codified the Supreme Court's holding in Fellows by 
passing H.R. 11283,66 which in present-day form comprises the latter-half of subsection 92a(a) 
and the entirety of subsection (b). Prior to the passage of H.R. 11283, the House Committee on 
Banking and Currency's report regarding the bill stated that 
[u]nder a recent decision of the United States Supreme Court it is clearly settled 
that Congress has the power to confer authority upon national banks to act in these 
.fiduciary capacities, where such powers are exercised by trust companies, State 
banks, or other competing corporations, even though the State law discriminates 
against national banks in this regard. The terms of section 1 l(k) are extended, 
therefore, to permit such powers to be granted to national banks in those States in 
which the State law discriminates against national banks in this respect.67 • 
Congress thus intended to create an equal playing field for national banks, and was wary of any 
potential competitive advantage afforded to State institutions by State law. 
Decades later, through the passage of the National Bank Act of 1962, Congress removed 
the power originally vested in the Federal Reserve Board under § 11 (k) and transferred it to the 
Comptroller of the Currency.68 This Act of Congress effectively repealed69 the language of § 
1 l(k) of the Federal Reserve Act and reenacted it as 12 U.S.C. § 92a(a)-{b). On September 13, 
1962, the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency issued Senate Report No. 2039, urging the 
66Act of Sept 26, 1918, ch. 177, 40 Stat. 967, 968-69 (1918). 
67H.R Rep. No. 65-479, reprinted in U.S. Serial Set vol. 7307 (1918). 
68National Bank Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-722,76 Stat. 668 (enacting H.R 12577). 
69
"Subsection (k) of section 11 of the Federal Reserve Ac t . . . is repealed by [H.R. 
12577] in a purely technical sense only. In effect, the provisions of that subsection become the 
. first section of the bill, with the Comptroller of the Currency being substituted for the Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System as the responsible administrative agency." H.R. Rep. 
No. 87-2255, at 4, reprinted in U.S. Serial Set vol. 12433 (1962): 
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passage of the National Bank Act of 1962.70 Therein, the committee included a "General. 
Statement" which made abundantly clear that 
this bill will result in no change in the present distribution of power between 
Federal and State Governments, nor will it cause any weakening of the principles 
underlying the dual banking system. . . . It would not give authority to the 
Comptroller of the Currency to exercise any supervisory functions over State 
banks.71 
The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency defines "dual banking system" as 
parallel state and federal banking systems that co-exist in the United States. The 
federal system is based on a federal bank charter, powers defined under federal 
law, operation under federal standards, and oversight by a federal supervisor. The 
state system is characterized by state chartering, bank powers established under 
state law, and operation under state standards, including oversight by state 
supervisors.72 
Therefore, when the plain language of § 92a is read in conjunction with the legislative 
history of the contravention clause, it is certain that Congress did not intend the laws of one State 
to pre-empt the laws of another State in dealing with a national bank. Rather, Congress made 
abundantly clear that "there was no purpose on the part of Congress to disregard the local State 
law, but merely to give its assent provided the State law permitted it to be done."73 In light of the 
foregoing, this court determines that Congress has spoken to the precise question at issue, and 
has determined that the law that shall apply to a national bank acting as trustee under a trust deed 
is the local State law, which in this instance is Utah law. 
70S. Rep. No. 87-2039, reprinted in 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2735-36; see also H.R. Rep. No. 
87-2255, reprinted in U.S. Serial Set vol. 12433 (1962) (adopted in substance by S. Rep. No. 87-
2039 and referenced in 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2735-36). 
nId at 2736. 
720ffice of the Comptroller of the Currency, National Banks and the Dual Banking 
System 1 (September 2003), at http://www.occ.gov/sMic/publications/DualBanking.pdf 
7351 Cong. Re.c. S879 (December 15, 1913) (statement of Sen. Owen). 
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(b) Whether the Comptroller's interpretation is reasonable (in the event that the statute is 
silent or ambiguous) 
Although the reasonableness of the Comptroller's interpretation need only be addressed if 
Congress has not previously spoken as to the precise question at issue, which it has, for the sake 
of completeness, the court will also examine the reasonableness of the Comptroller's 
interpretation found in 12 C.F.R. § 9.7(d). 
The Comptroller is charged with interpreting the statute in a reasonable manner. It is not 
charged with amending the law. The Supreme Court has stated in regards to 12 U.S.C. § 92a(a) 
that cc[n]ot surprisingly, this Court has interpreted those explicit provisions to mean what they 
say."74 If § 92a is to mean what it says (i.e., the plain meaning), the reference to "State or local 
law"at a minimum should be construed to mean the State in which the trust activity occurs. 
With the legislative history of § 92a in mind, it is important to note that the Comptroller 
was not always a proponent of the interpretation found in 12 C.F.R. § 9.7(d). Indeed^ in large 
part, the Comptroller based 12 C.F.R. § 9.7(d) on two interpretive letters issued in October 
1999.75 But rarely mentioned in this rulemaking is the Comptroller's Interpretive Letter No. 695, 
which issued in December 1995.76 
The Comptroller issued Interpretive Letter No. 695 in response to a national bank's 
inquiry as to whether the national bank had authority to conduct fiduciary activities on a 
nationwide basis through trust offices in various states.77 Therein, the Comptroller stated that 
1ABamettBank of Marion County, NA. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 34 (1996). 
75Interpretive Letter No. 866,1999 WL 983923 (October 8, 1999); Interpretive Letter No. 
872, 1999 WL 1251391 (October 28,1999). 
76Merpretive Letter No. 695, 1996 WL 187825 (December 8, 1995). 
7 7 K a t * l . 
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. the effect of section 92a is that in any specific state, the availability of fiduciary 
powers is the same for out-of-state national banks or for in-state national banks 
and is dependent upon what the state permits for its own state institutions. A state 
may limit national banks from exercising any or all fiduciary powers in that state, 
but only if it also bars its own institutions from exercising the same powers. 
Therefore, a national bank with its main office in one state(such as the proposed 
trust bank) may conduct fiduciary business in that state and other states, 
depending upon - with respect to each state - whether each state allows its own 
institutions to engage in fiduciary business.78 
This interpretation is certainly reasonable as it—consistent with Congress' intent—precludes a 
competitive advantage as between state-chartered banks and national banks. Such an 
interpretation also precludes a competitive advantage between in-state national banks and out-of-
state national banks. This principle was further emphasized by the Comptroller in Letter No. 695: 
This interpretation of the statute also fosters desirable public policies. First, every 
national bank offering fiduciary services in a given state will have the same 
authority to conduct fiduciary business. A national bank conducting fiduciary 
business and administering trust assets at a trust office will be subject to the same 
standards irrespective of whether the office is part of an in-state national bank or 
an out-of-state national bank. Second, there will be a level playing field for 
enhanced competition in the provision of fiduciary services within each state, 
because more potential providers will be able to compete on similar terms.19 
This means that a national bank based in Texas which performs fiduciary functions in Utah 
cannot have a competitive advantage over a Utah-based national bank that performs its fiduciary 
functions in Utah. However, under the Comptroller's final rule, a national bank based in Texas 
does have a competitive advantage over a national bank based in Utah as well as Utah-chartered 
banks. Such a result is simply contrary to Congress' clear intent in enacting § 92a. 
The Comptroller further stated that 
section 92a authorizes national banks to offer fiduciary services in multiple states, 
but then conditions the exercise of that power within each state on a state-by-state 
basis under the same test: is the exercise of fiduciary powers by national banks 
nId. at *4 (emphasis added). 
19Id. at *14 (emphasis added). 
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prohibited by state law, and even if it is, does that state permit its state institutions 
to exercise these powers or not. This result is consistent with other banking 
statutes that treat a single national hank as present in different states for the 
purposes of that statute m 
The Comptroller cited various cases to support its position that "for the purposes of these 
statutes, a national bank is not located only in the place of its main office but can be 'located/ 
'situated3 or 'existing' in, or be a 'citizen' of, multiple cities, counties, or states."81 Therefore, in 
light of Interpretive Letter No. 695, it seems unreasonable, if not irrational, for the Comptroller to 
now posit that a national bank is only "located" in the place where it conducts "core fiduciary 
activities."82 . 
n 
™Id. -at * 12 (eniphasis added). 
S]Id. at *13 (citing Citizens & S Nat'I Bank v. Bougas, 434 U.S. 35, 44 (1977); Fisher v. 
First Nat 7 Bank of Omaha, 548 F.2d 255 (8th Cir. 1977); Fisher v. First Nat 7 Bank of Chicago, 
538 F.2d 1284 (7th Cir. 1976), cert denied, 429 U.S. 1062 (1977); Seattle Trust & Say. Bankv. 
BankofCal N.A, 492 F.2d 48 (9th Cir. 1974), cert denied, 419 U.S. 844 (1974); Bank of NY. 
v. Bank of Am., 853 F. Supp. 736 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); Conn. Nat'I Bankv. Iacono, 785 F. Supp. 30 
(D.R.L 1992)). 
82The Supreme Court in Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass% 129 S. Ct. 2710 (2009), held 
that the Comptroller's interpretation of another portion of the National Bank Act—12 U.S.C. § 
484(a)—was unreasonable. See id. at 2719 ("The Comptroller's regulation, therefore, does not 
comport with the statute. Neither does the Comptroller's interpretation of its regulation . . . . " ) . 
12 U.S.C. § 484(a) provides that "[n]o national bank shall be subject to any visitorial 
powers except as authorized by Federal law, vested in the courts of justice or such as shall be, or 
have been exercised or directed by Congress or by either House thereof or by any committee of 
Congress or of either House duly authorized." 
In Cuomo, the Comptroller interpreted the statute in a way that would have prohibited the 
New York Attorney General from obtaining records from national banks to determine if the 
national banks were complying with state fair-lending laws. See Cuomo, 129 S. Ct; at 2714. 
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ReconTrust relies on two other interpretive letters83 issued by the Comptroller. Those 
letters were issued nearly four years after Interpretive Letter No. 695 and ostensibly provide the 
foundation for the.Comptroller's issuance of 12 C.ER." § 9.7.84 Seemingly contradicting the plain 
meaning of § 92a5s contravention clause as well as Interpretive Letter No. .695, the Comptroller 
in Interpretive Letter No. 866, stated that the location of a national bank is not determined by the 
location where the trust assets are located,85 but rather, where the bank acts in a fiduciary 
capacity.86 The Comptroller determined that a bank "acts in a fiduciary capacity" where it 
reviews proposed trust appointments, executes trust agreements, and makes discretionary 
decisions about the investment or distribution of trust assets.87 To then say that a bank does not 
"act in a fiduciary capacity" when it exercises the trustee's power of sale and does so in Utah is 
fantasy. 
Indeed, how the Comptroller decided to limit the above-listed activities as a trustee's core 
fiduciary functions, excluding the liquidation or disposal of trust assets, is nowhere explained. 
The Comptroller, after issuing an interpretive letter (No. 695) true to the statute's plain 
meaning and Congress' apparent intent as evinced by Senator Owens' statement in 1913, and 
Congress' subsequent acts (and corresponding statements) in 1918 and 1962, reversed its 
Z3See supra note 75. Twenty'days subsequent to the issuance of Letter No. 866,. the 
Comptroller issued Letter No. 872. The pertinent portion of the Comptroller's analysis in Letter 
No. 872 is taken verbatim from Letter No. 866, andas such, the court need not separately discuss 
the substance, of Letter No. 872. 
uSee 66 Fed. Reg. 34,792-01, 20.01 WL 731641, at *34795 (July 2,2001) ("These 
conclusions are consistent with the conclusions set out in IL 866 and IL 872."). 
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interpretation of the statute to now posit that the State law referred to in § 92a is solely that of the 
State where the trustee accepts the fiduciary appointment, executes the documents that create the 
fiduciary relationship, and makes discretionary decisions regarding the investment or distribution 
of fiduciary assets. 
• Interestingly, Letter Nos. 866 and 872 also contradict the view expressed in an article88 
co-authored by John D. Hawke, Jr.,89 which was written prior to Mr. Hawke's appomtment as the 
Comptroller. Mr, Hawke wrote in pertinent part: 
Section 92a specifically provides for deference to state law in defining the 
. powers of a national bank to act as a fiduciary, and does not operate as a grant of 
authority to create federal common law. Section 92a authorizes the Comptroller to 
grant to national banks the right to act as trustee and "in any other fiduciary 
capacity in which State banks, trust companies, or other corporations which come 
into competition with national banks are permitted to act under the laws of the 
State in which the national bank is located." On its face, section 92a is geared to 
principles of state law. Congress has specifically designated the scope of a 
national bank's trust powers to be coextensive with the trust powers of state banks 
in the state where the bank is located. Because the trust powers of state banks 
vary from state to state, so too do the trust powers of national banks. 
The statutory objective is to attain competitive equality between national 
banks and their state-chartered counterparts in the exercise of trust powers. 
Congress clearly intended national banks acting as trustees in a given state to 
have the same rights and duties as local state banks?0 
88
 John D. Hawke, Jr., Melanie L. Fein & David F. Freeman, Jr., The Authority of National 
Banks to Invest Trust Assets in Bank-advised Mutual Funds, 10 Ann. Rev. Banking L. 131 
(1991). 
89According to the Comptroller's website, Mr. Hawke served as the Comptroller of the 
Currency from 1998 to 2004, which encompasses the October 1999 publication of Letter Nos. 
866 and 872, see • 
http://www.occ.treas.gov/ab^ 
e.html (last visited Mar. 13, 2012). 
90Hawke, Fein & Freeman, supra note 88, at 140 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis 
added). 
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Mr. Hawke authored this passage prior to his appointment as Comptroller, and therefore, 
the above-excerpt was not written while serving in his official capacity. However, Mr. Hawke's 
analysis strikes the court as reasonable and in line with § 92a5s plain meaning and Congress' 
intent, whereas the final rule promulgated by the Comptroller does not. Moreover, nothing in the 
final rule explains why the final rule is preferable—let alone reasonable—to the interpretive 
approach taken in the above-quoted passage and in Interpretive Letter No. 695. 
The Comptroller has conceded that "national banks are [not] divorced from the standards 
of state law in all respects."91 Indeed, the Comptroller, in quoting the Supreme Court,92 stated that 
national banks are "subject to the laws of the State, and are governed in their daily 
course of business far more by the laws of the State than of the Nation. All their 
contracts are governed and construed by state laws. Their acquisition and transfer 
of property, their right to collect their debts, and their liability to be sued for 
debts, are all based on state law."93 
Certainly a national bank concerns itself with the acquisition and transfer of property, and its 
right to collect debts—which are both governed and construed by State law94—when it acts as 
successor trustee on a deed of real property, and attempts to foreclose the same through a 
nonjudicial foreclosure sale. 
In sum, the national statutes which created a dual banking system operate to deny out-of-
state national banks any competitive advantage over local, state-chartered banks or in-state 
9
 Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, National Banks and the Dual Banking 
System 26 (September 2003), at http://www.occ.gov/sMic/publications/DuaBanking.pdf. 
nNat 7 Bank v. Commonwealth, 76 U.S. 353 (1869) (emphasis added). 
93Id. at 362; see also Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, National Banks and the 
Dual Banking System 27 (September 2003), at 
http://www.occ.gov/static/publications/Duaffiariking.pdf (quoting Bank of Am. v. City & County 
of San Francisco, 309 F.3d 551, 559 (9th Cir. 2002)).. 
94See NaflBankv. Commonwealth, 76 U.S. at 362. 
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national banks. Such was and is the will of Congress as expressed in statutory language and 
legislative history, both consistent with the principles of Federalism, as reflected in the Tenth 
Amendment of the Constitution. 
The Comptroller's interpretation of § 92a, as set forth in 12 C.F.R. § 9.7(d), modifies the 
statute and gives out-of-state national banks a sizeable competitive advantage over their state-
chartered counterparts and in-state national banks in states—such as Utah—where state-chartered 
banks and in-state national banks are not allowed to perform certain fiduciary functions, namely 
exercising the power of sale in non-judicial trust deed foreclosures. 
Thus, 12 C.F.R. § 9.7(d) does not justify the deference contemplated in Chevron for 
agency construction of pertinent statutes. 
There are fifty States. Each has its own legislature and each its own set of laws relating to 
state-chartered banks. Texas does not pass Utah banking laws. Utah does not pass Texas banking 
laws. Utah banks are limited by Utah laws as to the manner of conducting non-judicial 
foreclosures of real property. National statutes have recognized that local laws have a role to play 
in a dual banking system and have done so from at least 1913, when the Federal Reserve Act was 
passed and predecessor language was first installed in that Act 
2. The competition clause of 12 U.S.C. § 92a 
12 U.S.C. § 92a(a) permits the Comptroller to grant a national bank the power to act in 
any fiduciary capacity that a state bank, corporation or organization "which comefs] into 
competition with national banks are permitted to act under the laws of the State in which the 
national bank is located.55 
Driving the point home, Congress also enacted subsection (b), which provides that 
27 
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[w]henever the laws of such State authorize or permit the exercise of any or all of 
the foregoing powers by State banks, trust companies, or other corporations which 
compete with national banks, the granting to and the exercise of such powers by 
national banks shall not be deemed to be in contravention of State or local law 
within the meaning of this section.95 
The Supreme Court had an opportunity to examine the statute in Burnes Nat 7 Bank v. 
Duncan,96 wherein Justice Holmes opined that the foregoing passages state "in a roundabout and 
polite but unmistakable way that whatever may be the State law, national banks having the 
permit of the Federal Reserve Board may act as executors if trust companies competing with 
them have that power."97 The holding hi Burnes Nat 7 Bank also applies to national banks who 
wish to act as trustees so long as competing State institutions also act as trustees. 
This is of no help to ReconTrust, a subsidiary of a national bank. It is not in competition 
with a bar member. It is not in competition with a title insurance company. Indeed, the statutes 
prohibit a bank from engaging in title insurance activity.98 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 57-1-21, 57-1-23.5 were both drafted so that the fiduciaries 
contemplated in 12 U.S.C. § 92a (including both state banks and national banks acting as 
trustees) would have to work in concert with—not in competition with—title insurance 
r 
companies and active members of the State bar. Indeed, a state or national bank, acting as trustee, 
must procure the services of either an active member of the State, bar or title insurance company 
in order to comply with the Utah law. 
9512 U.S.C. § 92a(b) (emphasis added). 
96265 U.S. 17(1924). • 
97M. at23. 
9815 U.S.C.A. § 6713(a) (2009) ("No national bank may engage in any activity involving 
the under-writing or sale of title insurance."). 
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Banks compete with banks. Indeed, ReconTrust's status is by definition that of a national 
bank, and in this specialized and limited area of trust activity, it, like, all banks must comply with 
local law. •' 
III. CONCLUSION 
La light of the foregoing, plaintiffs' claim for declaratory relief under Utah Code Ann. § 
57-1-23.5 satisfies the standards set forth in Twombly and Iqbal. 
Because of ReconTrust's lack of authority to exercise the power of sale in a non-judicial 
foreclosure action within Utah, 
IT IS ORDERED that defendants' motion to dismiss is hereby DENIED. 
DATED tins IS day of March. 2012. 
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c 
Effective:[See Text Amendments] 
Code of Federal Regulations Currentness 
Title 12. Barnes and Banking 
Chapter I. Comptroller of the Currency, De-
partment of the Treasury 
*lPart 9. Fiduciary Activities of National 
Banks (Refs & Annos) 
*H Regulations 
-+ § 9.7 Multi-state fiduciary opera-
tions. 
(a) Acting in a fiduciary capacity in more than one 
state. Pursuant to 12 U.S.C. 92a and this section, a 
national bank may act in a fiduciary capacity in any 
state. If a national bank acts, or proposes to act, in a 
fiduciary capacity in a particular state, the bank 
may act in the following specific capacities: 
(1) Any of the eight fiduciary capacities ex-
pressly listed in 12 U.S.C. 92a(a), unless the 
state prohibits its own state banks, trust com-
panies, and other corporations that compete 
with national banks in that state from acting in 
that capacity; and 
(2) Any other fiduciary capacity the state per-
mits for its own state banks, trust companies, 
or other corporations that compete with nation-
al banks in that state. 
(b) Serving customers in other states. While acting 
in a fiduciary capacity in one state, a national bank 
may market its fiduciary services to, and act as fi-
duciary for, customers located in any state, and it 
may act as fiduciary for relationships that include 
property located in other states. The bank may use a 
trust representative office for this purpose. 
(c) Offices in more than one state. A national bank 
with fiduciary powers may establish trust offices or 
trust representative offices in any state. 
(d) Determination of the state referred to in 12 
U.S.C. 92a. For each fiduciary relationship, the 
state referred to in section 92a is the state in which 
the bank acts in a fiduciary capacity for that rela-
tionship. A national bank acts in a fiduciary capa-
city in the state in which it accepts the fiduciary ap-
pointment, executes the documents that create the 
fiduciary relationship, and makes discretionary de-
cisions regarding the investment or distribution of 
fiduciary assets. If these activities take place in 
more than one state, then the state in which the 
bank acts in a fiduciary capacity for section 92a 
purposes is the state that the bank designates from 
among those states. 
(e) Application of state law— 
(1) State laws used in section 92a. The state 
laws that apply to a national bank's fiduciary 
activities by virtue of 12 U.S.C. 92a are the 
laws of the state in which the bank acts in a fi-
duciary capacity. 
(2) Other state laws. Except for the state laws 
made applicable to national banks by virtue of 
12 U.S.C. 92a, state laws limiting or establish-
ing preconditions on the exercise of fiduciary 
powers are not applicable to national banks. 
[66 FR 34798, July 2, 2001] 
SOURCE: 61 FR 68554, Dec. 30, 1996, unless oth-
erwise noted. 
AUTHORITY: 12 U.S.C. 24 (Seventh), 92a, and 
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RULES and REGULATIONS 
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 
12 CFR Parts 5 and 9 
[Docket No. 01-14] 
RJN 1557-AB79 
Fiduciary Activities of National Banks 
Monday, July 2, 2001 
*34792 AGENCY: Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Treasury. 
ACTION: Final rule. 
SUMMARY: The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) is publishing its final rule regarding the au-
thority and standards for national banks to conduct multi-state trust operations. The purpose of these changes is 
to provide enhanced guidance to national banks engaging in fiduciary activities. 
EFFECTIVE DATE: August 1, 2001. 
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Lisa Lintecum, Director, or Joel Miller, Senior Advisor, Asset. 
Management, (202) 874-4447; Richard Cleva, Senior Counsel, Bank Activities and Structure Division, (202) 
874-5300; Andra Shuster, Counsel, Legislative and Regulatory Activities Division, (202) 874-5090; or William 
Dehnke, Assistant Director, Securities and Corporate Practices Division, (202) 874-5210. 
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On December 5, 2000, the OCC published a notice of proposed rule-
making (NPRM) in the Federal Register (65 FR 75872) to amend 12 CFR part 9 to add provisions addressing the 
application of 12 U.S.C. 92a in the context of a national bank engaging in fiduciary activities in more than one 
state. The purpose of the rulemaking was to provide clarity and certainty for national banks' multi-state fiduciary 
activities. The standards contained in the NPRM reflected positions taken in three earlier OCC Interpretive Let-
ters. [FN1] Interpretive Letter No. 695 found that a national bank authorized to engage in fiduciary activities may 
act in a fiduciary capacity in any state that permits its own in-state fiduciaries to act in that capacity, including at 
trust offices. Interpretive Letters Nos. 866 and 872 clarified that a national bank that acts in a fiduciary capacity 
in one state may market its fiduciary services to customers in other states, solicit business from them, and act as 
fiduciary for customers located in other states. The NPRM and the final rule are based upon the detailed analysis 
contained in these Interpretive Letters. 
FN1 OCC Interpretive Letter No. 872 (Oct 28, 1999) reprinted in [1999-2000 
Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 81-366 (IL 872); OCC Interpretive 
Letter No. 866 (Oct. 8, 1999) reprinted in (1999-2000 Transfer Binder] Fed. 
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Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 81-360 (IL $66)', and OCC Interpretive Letter No. 695 
(Dec. 8, 1995), reprinted in [1995-1996 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. 
(CCH) 81-010 (IL 695). 
Along with the NPRM, we also published an advance notice of proposed rulemaking (ANPR) inviting comments 
on whether the OCC should establish uniform national standards for the conduct of fiduciary activities by na-
tional banks. The ANPR invited comments on whether uniform standards of care generally applicable to nation-
al bank trustees' administration of private trusts and investment of private trust property should be established. 
We received comments on both the NPRM and the ANPR As discussed further below, comments on the NPRM 
predominantly were favorable. Comments on the ANPR were more mixed, raising a significant number of issues 
that will require additional analysis before any determination is made concerning how to proceed. Rather than 
delay addressing the issues covered by the OCC interpretations, we are issuing this final rule, which covers only 
the matters included in the NPRM, and are reserving a decision whether to proceed with a proposal to establish 
uniform fiduciary standards pending completion of our analysis of the issues raised by the commenters. 
The OCC received 25 comments on the NPRM. These comments included 4 from state bank supervisors' offices, 
1 from a state bank supervisors' organization, 6 from banking trade associations, 13 from banks and bank hold-
ing companies, and 1 from a law firm. Most of the commenters supported the proposed changes, although sever-
al offered additional suggestions for changes. The state bank supervisors disagreed with the proposal and ex-
pressed concern about the effect the rule would have on the application of state laws to national banks engaged 
in fiduciary activities. 
For the reasons discussed below, we have adopted the provisions of the NPRM substantially as proposed, but 
have made a number of changes in response to the comments received to clarify certain provisions. 
Description of Proposal, Comments Received, and Final Rule 
Definitions (Revised § 9J) 
Proposed § 9.2 defined "trust office" and "trust representative office" in §§ 9.2(j) and (k), respectively. A "trust 
office" was defined as an office of a national bank, other than a main office or a branch, at which the bank acts 
in a fiduciary capacity. A "trust representative office" was defined as an office of a national bank, other than a 
main office, branch, or trust office, at which the bank performs activities ancillary to its fiduciary business, but 
does not act in a fiduciary capacity. 
The final rule modifies the definition of trust office to clarify that it includes all offices where the bank engages 
in one or more of the key fiduciary activities specified in § 9.7(d) —i.e., accepting the fiduciary appointment, ex-
ecuting the documents that create the fiduciary relationship, or making discretionary decisions regarding the in-
vestment or distribution of fiduciary assets. The definition in the proposal focused on where the bank acted in a 
fiduciary capacity (where the key fiduciary activities were performed) and implicitly assumed that all of the key 
fiduciary activities would be performed in one state for each fiduciary relationship (so that "acting in a fiduciary 
capacity" and performing the key activities were the same). However, as discussed in detail below in connection 
with § 9.7(d), in some instances, the key activities may be performed at offices in different states for some fidu-
ciary relationships. In those instances, as provided in § 9.7(d) *34793 a bank must determine one state in which 
it acts in a fiduciary capacity for purposes of 12 U.S.C. 92a. That means that there will remain other offices in 
other states in which the bank performs key fiduciary activities that, under the definition in the proposal, would 
© 2012 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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not have been considered to be trust offices. However, our intention was that because each of these key activities 
is significant standing alone, all offices in which a bank engages in any of the key fiduciary activities should be 
considered to be trust offices. Therefore, the final rule clarifies the definition of "trust office" to be an office of a 
national bank, other than a main office or a branch, at which the national bank engages in one or more of the 
activities specified in § 9.7(d). A corresponding change has been made to § 9.2(k). A "trust representative of-
fice" is defined as an office of a national bank, other than a main office, branch, or trust office, at which the 
bank performs activities ancillary to its fiduciary business, but does not engage in any of the activities specified 
in § 9.7(d). 
Section 9.2(k) of the proposal listed the following examples of ancillary activities: advertising, marketing, and 
soliciting for fiduciary business; contacting existing or potential customers, answering questions, and providing 
information about matters related to their accounts; acting as a liaison between the trust office and the customer 
(e.g., forwarding requests for distribution or changes in investment objectives, or forwarding forms and funds re-
ceived from the customer); or simply inspecting or maintaining custody of fiduciary assets. 
A number of commenters suggested that various activities be added to the list of examples of ancillary activities. 
The list of ancillary activities set forth in § 9.2(k) is illustrative only, however, and not all-inclusive. While the 
OCC considers many of the suggested activities to be ancillary activities, we have not included most of them in 
the text of the final rule because the list set out in the definition is not intended to be comprehensive. A national 
bank may therefore identify additional activities as ancillary without seeking the express concurrence of the 
OCC. To make this clear, we have added to the text of the final rule an express statement that the items on the 
list are illustrative and that other activities may also be "ancillary" for the purposes of the definition. [FN2] 
FN2 Classifying activities as "ancillary" in §§ 9.2(j) and (k) is meant only to as-
sist in the determination of the state in which the bank is acting in a fiduciary ca-
pacity for section 92a purposes. Only the key fiduciary activities in § 9.7(d) are 
relevant for determining that state: all other activities are "ancillary" for this pur-
pose. This classification does not affect the importance of such activities or 
change in any way a bank's fiduciary duty with respect to such activities. 
Two commenters urged that holding title to real property in any state be added to the list of ancillary activities in 
§ 9.2(k), because some state laws attempt to prohibit out-of-state entities from taking title to real property 
without a state license or other authorization. Because this appears to be a'specific issue warranting clarification, 
we have added holding title to real estate to the list of ancillary activities in § 9.2(k). The statutory authority for 
national banks to exercise fiduciary powers, 12 U.S.C. 92a, does not subject the exercise of a national bank's fi-
duciary powers to restrictions or preconditions, such as licensing requirements, under state law. State laws pro-
hibiting out-of-state national banks from taking title to real property have such an effect. For these reasons, and 
because we believe that this activity is consistent with national banks' exercise of their fiduciary powers, we 
have added holding title to real property to the list of ancillary activities in the final rule.[FN3] Consistent with 
this change, we also have added language to § 9.7(b) to clarify that while acting in a fiduciary capacity in one 
state, a bank may act as fiduciary for relationships that include property located in other states. 
FN3 This is consistent with the Office of Thrift Supervision's (OTS) position un-
der its parallel statute. See OTS Chief Counsel Opinion (August 8, 1996), reprin-
ted in [1996-1997 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 83-102 (OTS 
August 1996 Opinion) (holding title to real property as trustee in a state would not 
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cause a federal savings association to be located in that state because the activity 
is incidental and not discretionary). 
As we stated in the NPRM, neither a trust office nor a trust representative office is a branch for purposes of the 
McFadden Act, 12 U.S.C. 36, which governs the location of national bank branches. In order to be considered a 
branch under the McFadden Act, a bank facility must perform at least one of the core branching functions of re-
ceiving deposits, paying checks, or lending money. 12 U.S.C. 360. The locational limitations of 12 U.S.C. 36 
are not intended to reach all activities in which national banks are authorized to engage, but only core branching 
functions. See Clarke v. Securities Industry Association, 479 U.S. 388 (1987) (considering securities brokerage 
powers) (Clarke). Proposed §§ 9.2(j) and (k) therefore stated that a trust office or a trust representative office is 
not a branch unless it is also an office at which deposits are received, or checks paid, or money lent.[FN4] 
FN4 This final rule is consistent with the limitation, found in 12 U.S.C. 93a, 
which states that the general rulemaking authority vested in the OCC by that sec-
tion "does not apply to section 36 of [Title 12 of the United States Code]." This 
limitation simply makes clear that section 93a does not expand whatever authority 
the OCC has pursuant to other statutes to adopt regulations affecting national 
bank branching. Congress clearly contemplated that the OCC would implement 
section 36, as is evidenced by the repeated references to obtaining the OCC's ap-
proval throughout that section (see, e.g., paragraphs (b)(1), (b)(2), (c), (g), and (i) 
of section 36). It would be illogical to conclude that the OCC, in implementing 
the provisions requiring national banks to obtain the OCC's prior approval under 
the sections cited, cannot interpret what the terms of the statute mean or that the 
interpretation must be made on a case-by-case basis. This rulemaking simply cla-
rifies a situation that falls outside the branching restrictions imposed by section 36 . 
Several state bank supervisors disagreed with the OCC's conclusion that fiduciary activities are not core branch-
ing functions and stated their belief that trust offices should be considered to be branches. They assert that the 
Clarke case held only that discount brokerage activities are not core branching functions and should not be read 
to conclude that any other activities are not core branching functions. 
The OCC has carefully considered these comments, but remains of the view that fiduciary activities under sec-
tion 92a do not constitute core branching functions and that a national bank office that provides only fiduciary 
services would not be subject to the McFadden Act. In Clarke, the Supreme Court held that the McFadden Act's 
locational limits do not reach all activities in which national banks engage. This conclusion in the Clarke case is 
reinforced by the recent decision in First National Bank of McCook, Nebraska v. Fulkerson, et al, Civil Action 
No. 98-D-1024, slip op. (D.C. Co. March 7, 2000), where the court held that the combination of a deposit pro-* 
duction office, a loan production office, and an ATM do not constitute a branch because no core branching func-
tions are performed.[FN5] 
FN5 See also Bank One, Utah v. Guttau, 190 F. 3d 844 (8th Cir. 1999) (ATMs are 
excluded from the definition of "branch"). 
Finally, the second sentence in current § 9.2(g) provides that the extent of fiduciary powers is the same for out-
of-state national banks as in-state national banks. We proposed to remove this sentence as unnecessary in light 
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of new § 9.7, which sets forth the rules concerning multi-state fiduciary operations. We received no comments 
on this proposed change, and have adopted it as proposed.*34794 
Approval Requirements (revised §9.3) 
Current § 9.3(a) provides that "[a] national bank may not exercise fiduciary powers unless it obtains prior ap-
proval from the OCC to the extent required under 12 CFR 5.26." Section 5.26(e)(5) currently provides that a na-
tional bank that has obtained the OCC's approval to exercise fiduciary powers does not need to obtain further ap-
proval to "commence fiduciary activities" in a state in addition to the state(s) described in the application for 
which it received OCC approval to exercise fiduciary powers. Instead, the bank is required only to provide writ-
ten notice to the OCC within ten days after commencing fiduciary activities in a new state. 
Under the proposal, a bank that has received OCC approval to exercise fiduciary powers does not need prior 
OCC approval each time it seeks to act in a fiduciary capacity in a new state or to conduct activities in a new 
state that are ancillary to its fiduciary business. Proposed paragraph (b) also directs the bank to follow the notice 
procedures in § 5.26(e)(5) (discussed below) in order to emphasize that revised § 9.3(b) is consistent with § 
5.26(e)(5) and is not intended to impose any additional or different procedures on national banks. Current para-
graph (b), which addresses the procedures for organizing a' limited purpose trust bank, would be redesignated as 
paragraph (c). 
We received one comment on this proposed change, suggesting that we clarify in § 9.3(b) that marketing and so-
liciting fiduciary business are included in ancillary activities. Because this is made clear in § 9.2(k), it is unne-
cessary to repeat it in this provision. The final rule has, however, been changed to reflect the modified definition 
of "trust office" in § 9.2(j). Consistent with § 5.26(e)(5) of the final rule, this provision now states that a national 
bank granted fiduciary powers by the OCC is not required to obtain the OCC's prior approval to engage in any of 
the activities specified in § 9.7(d) in a new state or to conduct ancillary fiduciary activities in a new state. 
Multi-State Fiduciary Operations (New § 9.7) 
The statutory authority for national banks to exercise fiduciary powers is contained in 12 U.S.C. 92a(a) and (b). 
In IL 872, IL 866, and IL 695, the OCC considered how the language of section 92a would be applied in an in-
terstate context. 
Under section 92a, national banks may exercise fiduciary powers with OCC approval.Section 92a(a) states: 
The Comptroller of the Currency shall be authorized and empowered to grant by special permit to national banks 
applying therefor, when not in contravention of State or local law, the right to act as trustee, executor, adminis-
trator, registrar of stocks and bonds, guardian of estates, assignee, receiver, committee of estates of lunatics, or 
in any other fiduciary capacity in which State banks, trust companies, or other corporations which come into 
competition with national banks are permitted to act under the laws of the State in which the national bank is 
located. (Emphasis added). 
Section 92a(b) clarifies that, whenever state law permits state banks, trust companies, or other corporations that 
compete with national banks (State Fiduciaries) to exercise any of the fiduciary powers in section 92a(a), a na-
tional bank's exercise of those powers is deemed not to be in contravention of State or local law under section 92a. 
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Thus, "when not in contravention of State or local law" (the Contravention Clause), a national bank may act in 
any of the fiduciary capacities specified in section 92a(a). This statutory grant of authority does not limit where 
a national bank,may act in a fiduciary capacity. Nor does it require that the customers for whom the bank may 
act or the property involved in the fiduciary relationship be located in the same state as the bank. A bank is free 
to act in a fiduciary capacity in more than one state. 
The Contravention Clause in section 92a(a) requires that a national bank look to the laws of the state in which it 
acts, or proposes to act, in a fiduciary capacity to determine what fiduciary capacities are permissible.[FN6] The 
state in which the bank acts in a fiduciary capacity for each existing or proposed fiduciary relationship is the 
state in which the bank performs the key fiduciary activities of accepting fiduciary appointments, executing doc-
uments that create the fiduciary relationship, or making decisions regarding the investment or distribution of fi-
duciary assets. This state is also the state referred to in other provisions in section 92a that refer to state law 
(subsections 92a(b), (c), (f), (g) and (i)) (the Section 92a State). 
FN6 The last phrase in paragraph (a) of section 92a refers to the state in which the 
national bank is "located." The primary reference to a state is in the Contravention 
Clause regarding the right to act in fiduciary capacities (the language emphasized 
above). That language was in the statute originally, before the phrase using the 
term "located" was added. Thus, we believe that the reference to the state in 
which a bank is located refers to the state in which the bank is acting in a fidu-
ciary capacity. We note that the OTS construes its parallel statute in a similar 
way. The OTS concludes that a federal savings association may exercise fiduciary 
powers permitted for state fiduciaries in the states in which it is located, but it is 
"located" for this purpose in the state in which it performs key fiduciary func-
tions. See, e.g., OTS August 1996 Opinion. 
Section 9.7 of the proposed rule reflected this interpretation of section 92a. In paragraph (a) of proposed § 9.7, 
we stated that a national bank may act in a fiduciary capacity in any state. Proposed § 9.7(a) went on to state that 
if a national bank acts, or proposes to act, in a fiduciary capacity in a particular state, the bank may act in any of 
. the eight fiduciary capacities expressly listed in section 92a(a) unless the state affirmatively prohibits that capa-
city for its own State Fiduciaries as well as any other capacity a state permits for its own State Fiduciaries. This 
authority exists even if the state purports to restrict it for national banks. If state law is silent with respect to one 
(or more) of the eight capacities listed in section 92a(a), then that capacity is not in contravention of state law 
and a national bank may act in that capacity. 
These conclusions, along with a more complete explanation of their underlying reasons, were stated in IL 695 
and IL 872. As previously noted, the proposal intended to reflect the conclusions reached in those letters and is 
based on the reasoning stated therein. 
Most of the comments on proposed § 9.7(a) supported its adoption. Of these, several requested that we clarify 
that the question of where a national bank is located for purposes of section 92a is a question of federal law. 
Comments from several state bank supervisors objected to proposed § 9.7(a), on the grounds that it would per-
mit national banks a competitive advantage by being able to expand their fiduciary activities into states notwith-
standing state limits on who may act as fiduciary. These commenters maintained that section 92a preserves for 
each state the right to establish such limits. They also suggested that the determination of which state's laws gov-
ern the permissible capacities should be resolved by whether a national bank has its main office or a branch loc-
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ated in that state. 
As set out above, we believe that section 92a imposes no limitations on where a bank may act in a fiduciary ca-
pacity. Under the Contravention Clause, a state may not prohibit or restrict national banks (including out-
of-state national banks) from acting in a fiduciary capacity in the state in any manner, unless it also limits its 
own State Fiduciaries. 
Moreover, we disagree that "location" for purposes of section 92a is appropriately determined by the presence of 
a main office or bank branch. As previously discussed, the Contravention Clause of section 92a*34795 requires 
that a bank look to the laws of the state in which it acts in one or more fiduciary capacities in order to determine 
the limits on those capacities. 
For the reasons discussed above, we have adopted proposed § 9.7(a) as proposed, making only stylistic changes 
to improve the readability of this provision. 
Once the state in which a national bank is acting in a fiduciary capacity is identified, the fiduciary services may 
be offered regardless of where the fiduciary customers reside or where property that is being administered is loc-
ated. This point was incorporated in proposed § 9.7(b), which provided that a national bank may market its ser-
vices to customers in other states and solicit business from them. It also may establish and use a trust represent-
ative office for these purposes. Accordingly, a state may not prohibit or restrict out-of-state national banks from 
marketing to, or performing fiduciary functions for, customers in that state. Such state laws are not within the 
powers reserved to the states by section 92a, and so they cannot prohibit or restrict a national bank's exercise of 
its federally granted powers.[FN7] These conclusions are consistent with the conclusions set out in IL 866 and 
IL 872.[FN8] 
FN7 See, e.g., Barnett Bank of Marion County v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25 (1996). 
FN8 The OTS has reached the same conclusions under its parallel statute. See, 
e.g., OTS August 1996 Opinion (federal savings association will not be deemed 
located in a state where its only trust-related activities are marketing its trust ser-
vices and performing incidental duties pursuant to its appointment as testamentary 
trustee or trustee holding real estate; and federal law would preempt state laws 
that prohibit or restrict an out-of-state federal thrift from engaging in these activit-
ies in the state); OTS Chief Counsel Opinion No. 94/CC-13 (June 13, 1994), re-
printed in [1994 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 82,814 (trust mar-
keting and referral activities at affiliate's offices does not make federal savings as-
sociation located at those offices; state laws that prohibit or restrict an out-of-state 
federal thrift from engaging in these activities in the state are preempted). 
A few commenters asked that we clarify that § 9.7(b) does not require a national bank to establish a trust repres-
entative office in order to market its fiduciary services to, or act as a fiduciary for, customers in any state. We 
agree that a bank need not establish a trust representative office; the reference to trust representative offices was 
intended solely to illustrate one option available to national banks who seek to market their fiduciary services. 
The final rule, like the proposal, states that a national bank "may" use a trust representative office to market its 
fiduciary services to and act as a fiduciary for customers in any state, indicating that use of a trust representative 
office is discretionary. As noted earlier, we also have added language to § 9.7(b) to clarify that while acting in a 
fiduciary capacity in one state, a bank may act as fiduciary for relationships that include property located in oth-
© 2012 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Page 9 of 16 
66 FR 34792-01, 2001 WL 731641 (F.R.) Page 8 
er states. 
As previously discussed, section 92a imposes no geographic limit on where a bank may act in a fiduciary capa-
city. Similarly, there is no geographic limit on where a bank may offer services that are incidental to acting in a 
fiduciary capacity. Accordingly, proposed § 9.7(c) reflected the conclusions stated in the Interpretive Letters 
that a national bank with fiduciary powers may establish a trust office or trust representative office in any state. 
We received no comments on proposed § 9.7(c) as such, and we have adopted it as proposed. 
Proposed § 9.7(d) clarified how national banks may determine the state in which they are acting in a fiduciary 
capacity. In IL 866 and IL 872, we concluded that a national bank is deemed to be "acting in a fiduciary capa-
city" for purposes of section 92a in the state in which the bank performs the key fiduciary functions of executing 
the documents that create the fiduciary relationship, accepting the fiduciary appointment, and making decisions 
regarding the investment or distribution of fiduciary assets. As proposed, § 9.7(d) incorporated this position and 
further provided that, if with respect to a particular fiduciary relationship these key fiduciary activities take 
place in more than one state, then the state in which the bank acts in a fiduciary capacity will be the state that the 
bank and customer designate from among those states. We specifically invited comment on ways to simplify the 
determination of where a bank with multi-state operations is acting in a fiduciary capacity. 
We received several comments relating to the determination of where a bank acts in a fiduciary capacity when 
the key fiduciary activities take place in more than one state. One commenter asked us to clarify whether it was 
our intent to have the choice of law clause in the trust's governing instrument be used to designate where the 
bank acted in a fiduciary capacity. Similarly, two commenters suggested that we look to the governing instru-
ment to make the determination. A few commenters suggested that, where the designation could not be made by 
the governing instrument or the customer has not or cannot otherwise make the designation, the bank be permit-
ted to do so alone. A few commenters also noted the importance of the meaning of the term "customer," noting 
that if defined too broadly, it could be quite burdensome for a bank to consult with customers to make the desig-
nation. 
We agree with those commenters who pointed out the potential problems, in situations where a bank performs 
the key fiduciary activities in more than one state, of requiring a bank to obtain customer agreement concerning 
the state in which the bank will be deemed to be acting in a fiduciary capacity. For instance, a bank could be 
forced to obtain the agreement of many different people residing in several different locations. To avoid these 
problems, we have revised § 9.7(d) to provide that a bank performing the key fiduciary activities in more than 
one state for any particular fiduciary relationship may designate from among these states which state's laws are 
made applicable by operation of section 92a for that relationship. We have also made some minor changes inten-
ded to improve the readability of § 9.7(d), including a change in its heading. 
Many of the commenters indicated some confusion over the significance of the determination of the Section 92a 
State.Section 92a directs the application of state law for purposes of determining a national bank's permissible 
fiduciary capacities (referred to in sections 92a(a) and (b)); for purposes of setting certain operational require-
ments for national banks as corporate fiduciaries (referred to in sections 92a(f), (g) & (i)); and for purposes of 
granting state banking authorities limited access to OCC examination reports relating to national bank trust de-
partments (referred to in section 92a(c)). Proposed § 9.7(d) provided a means to identify which state's laws ap-
ply for purposes of section 92a when a bank is conducting multi-state fiduciary activities. As discussed more 
fully below, this determination is separate from the selection of the substantive law that governs matters affect-
ing the exercise of the fiduciary appointment, such as standards of care. 
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Proposed § 9.7(e) provided a direct statement of how state law applies to a national bank engaging in fiduciary 
activities. As set out in the proposal, the state laws that apply to a national bank's fiduciary activities by opera-
tion of section 92a are the laws of the state in which the bank acts in a fiduciary capacity. 
Two commenters suggested that we clarify that state laws may not impose operational requirements on national 
banks that engage only in limited trust operations. In both IL 866 and IL 872 we stated that section 92a does not 
"condition the exercise of fiduciary *34796 powers on compliance with state laws that purport to impose licens-
ing or operating requirements on national banks."[FN9] This point is incorporated in § 9.7(e)(2) of the final rule, 
which provides that, with the exception of those state laws specifically referenced in section 92a, national banks' 
exercise of fiduciary powers is not subject to restrictions or preconditions under state law. Such restrictions and 
preconditions include, but are not limited to, state licensing requirements. This principle applies to the fiduciary 
activities of full service national banks as well as national banks that engage only in limited trust operations. 
FN9 See IL 866 p. 9; IL 872 p. 10. 
Section 9.7(e) does not affect the applicability of state substantive laws that govern the fiduciary relationship, 
such as the standard of care to be exercised by the fiduciary, or ability of a grantor to designate which state's 
laws govern the trust itself A grantor is free to designate which state laws apply for all other purposes or to have 
the applicable law determined by choice-of-law rules. For example, if the bank acting in a fiduciary capacity in 
State A is trustee for a trust whose grantor and beneficiaries are located in State B and the trust, by its terms, is 
governed by the laws of State C, then the laws of State C will govern the administration of the trust. The choice 
of law clause in a trust instrument does not, however, determine where a bank is acting in a fiduciary capacity or 
the laws that apply by operation of section 92a. That determination is a matter of federal law pursuant to section 
92a. It cannot be altered by agreement of the parties. 
Several state bank supervisors objected to the conclusion that a national bank is not subject to state laws that re-
strict the activities of out-of-state fiduciaries. However, as discussed above, the Contravention Clause in section 
92a only serves to limit national banks from engaging in fiduciary capacities that are not permitted for State Fi-
duciaries but does not otherwise limit a national bank's ability to exercise its federal authority in any state. State 
laws that are outside the ambit of the Contravention Clause, and so not authorized by Congress to apply to na-
tional banks, may not restrict or interfere with the exercise of permissible federal power. See, e.g., Bamett Bank, 
supra. 
The state supervisors also pointed to discussion in earlier OCC interpretive letters, in particular IL 525, that sug-
gested that all aspects of state law governing state fiduciary institutions applied to national banks. However, IL 
525 was concerned primarily with the substantive fiduciary standards that would apply to national banks in cer-
tain trust contexts. As noted above, the substantive law governing a trust is a different matter than the law made 
applicable to national banks by operation of section 92a. Moreover, the discussion of state law in IL 525 did not 
involve an interstate situation and was focused on the issue of the substantive fiduciary law governing the fidu-
ciary appointment. The OCC's analysis of the application of section 92a in the interstate context, including the 
manner in which it incorporates state law, is clearly set forth in ILs 872, S66, and 695, the NPRM, and this final 
rule. Any contrary implications in IL 525 do not represent the position of the agency. 
Deposit of Securities with State A uthorities (Revised §9.14) 
Under section 92a(f) and current § 9.14 of our regulations, a national bank must comply with state laws that re-
quire corporations that act in a fiduciary capacity to deposit securities with state authorities for the protection of 
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